Democracy Promotion For Dummies, Or What Is The Color Of Your Revolution?

Just a month ago, a Washington Post editorial shared with us some bad news: freedom is on retreat around the globe.  Helping the Post's editors arrive at such a sad conclusion was a survey by the Freedom House which claimed that the situation with the world's human rights has been deteriorating "for the fifth consecutive year."  Did it occur to the clowns from the Freedom House that the timing of their supposed trend conspicuously coincided with the George W. Bush administration's policy of advancing democracy at a gunpoint?  (Incidentally, supervising these clowns is a David Kramer, the Freedom House's executive director, who served  in the Bush administration as an assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor.  For democracy and human rights!  One can be sure that in this capacity, Kramer did his best to sharpen the administration's favorite democracy promotion tools, such as Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, CIA secret prisons and waterboarding.)   

It is therefore quite understandable that the eruption of street protests in Egypt has lifted the spirit of thousands of professional democracy promoters in Washington, DC.   And rightfully so: it's not every day that a "pro-democracy" crowd is challenging the rule of a bloody Middle Eastern tyrant. 

Yet, at the risk of sounding obstructive, I have a couple of clarifying questions for the folks who're more versed than me in the science and art of democracy promotion.  (Actually, I'd love to start with this one: if Egypt is on its way to  democracy, then why did many countries, including the United States, begin evacuating their citizens?  But I won't let this technical question distract us from the more fundamental.)  The first question: what kind of proof do we have that the mob regularly gathering at the Tahrir Square in Cairo represents a bona fide "pro-democracy" movement?  Now, there is no question that this movement is anti-Moubarak, but history provides us with enough examples of anti-movements -- the 1789 French Revolution, the 1917 Russian Revolution, and 1979 Iranian Revolution come to mind immediately -- that resulted in regimes that were arguably more brutal than the ones they replaced.  What exactly did the Tahrir Square protesters do or say to pursuade us that they were not simply anti-Mubarak, but pro-democracy?

And this leads me to my second question.  In democracy, the voice of majority rules.  Do we have any evidence that the protesters' demand for Moubarak's resignation reflects the opinion of the majority of Egyptians -- and not of a particular minority faction, however large, organized and determined?  This is not a fancy question.  We all remember mass protests that engulfed the streets of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, in the fall of 2007.  Many, myself included, believed that the days of Georgia's embattled president Mikheil Saakashvili were numbered.  But Saakashvili held on, and the protests have gradually stopped.  Why?  Because as much as Saakashvili was hated by the Georgian intellectuals running the show in Tbilisi, he was equally popular in the countryside where the majority of Georgians live.

I'm not an expert on the Middle East: I don't speak Arabic and my only personal experience with the region is restricted to a short tourist trip to Morocco.  (Yes, I know that a similar lack of knowledge of the Middle East doesn't prevent U.S. democracy promoters from comfortably issuing labels like "dictator", "pro-democracy", "moderate", "radical", etc.  But I can only speak for myself.)  I didn't plan to write about the Egypt protests and I changed my mind only in response to repeated attempts to bring parallels between the crisis in Egypt and the situation in Russia.

This, of course, shouldn't come as a surprise.  Ever since the glorious times of the Orange Revolution in Kyiv in November 2004, every case of mass disturbances in the post-Soviet space -- and now even in the Middle East! -- has been exploited as an excuse to stick the proverbial Mirror of the Russian Revolution into Russia's face.  My only wonder is which term will be chosen to describe the "revolution" that is supposed to bring  a "pro-democracy" change to Russia.  Somehow, I suspect that this isn't going to be a color, but, rather, a plant -- pretty much in line with the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan,  the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, or the Date Palm Revolution in Tunisia.  The Birch Revolution?  The Daisy Revolution?  Or, perhaps, something completely unorthodox: say, The Samovar Party Movement?

To assess whether Russia is ready for a "revolution", I turned to a man with an impressive track record of launching Russian revolutions.  Obviously, I'm speaking about Vladimit Ilyich Ulyanov-Lenin whose definition of the "revolutionary situation" -- presented in the 1915 article "The Collapse of the 2-nd International" -- still remains the golden standard in the field.

Lenin describes three major conditions characterizing a "pre-revolutionary" situation in a given country.  The first is the inability of the ruling class to execute its authority ("the top can't rule in the old way").  It is plain clear that with the approval ratings of Russia's top two leaders oscillating around 60%, the Russian ruling class remains in full control of the country.  President Medvedev's attempts at "modernizing" Russia's economic and political institutions, however clumsy at times, still reflect the ability of the Russian elites to adjust to the changing conditions on the ground. 

The second condition identified by Lenin is the sharply increased ("beyond the usual level") impoverishment of ordinary citizens ("the bottom doesn't want to live in the old way").  True, the economic crisis has decreased the living standards of ordinary Russians and further widened the already large gap between the wealthy and the poor.  Yet, at the average per-capita income of about $14,000, it's a huge stretch to call Russians impoverished "beyond the usual level."  Characteristically, over the past couple of years, only two significant mass protests, in Vladivostok and Kalinigrad, have been marked by economic demands, and Vladivstok was obviously a special case.  At least for now, the authorities have enough financial resources to prevent "economic" grievances from reaching the boiling point -- by increasing the pensions and salaries of state workers.

The third condition is the dramatic increase in political activity of ordinary people, their "readiness for spontaneous revolutionary actions", as Lenin called it.  This is definitely something that deserves consideration.  There is no question that mass political activity is on the rise in Russia.  However, so far, the most prominent anti-government movements, such as, for example, the Defenders of the Khimki Forest, have been alternating their protest actions with clever PR campaigning and occasional talks with the authorities.  And Medvedev is somewhat decreasing the likelyhood of "spontaneous" mass actions by holding well-publitized meetings with his Council on Civil Society and Human Rights, where "hot" topics are allowed to be at least publicly articulated.     

The close attention the West is paying to the regular episodes of a reality show mistakenly called "the rallies of the Russian opposition" is actually purely self-serving, as it allows the democracy promotion crowd to justify its own existence.  The spectacular clashes between wooden-headed "strategists-31" with equally wooden-headed omonovtsy may make great news in the Western media, but they can't hide this simple math: 1,500 of protesters gathering for such meetings represent less than a two-hundredth of a percent of the 10-million population of Moscow.  This is not something that the Kremlin should worry about.

What the Kremlin must worry about is the repeat of the demonstration that took place on the Manezhnaya Square on December 11, when a few thousand youngsters showed up out of the blue (or so it seemed) with the banners "Russia for Russians, Moscow for Muscowites!" and "Moscow is not the Caucasus!"  No efforts should be spared to prevent converting this, so far, one-off episode into another reality show.  For the genre of this show won't be Russia's "democratization."  It will be Russia's disintegration, something that even the evil Lenin didn't want happening to Russia.

Comments

[Joe Kozak]

Eugene,
I agree that, in essence, the military in Egypt has implemented a coup. But it was the demonstrators who forced the crisis situation. They demanded a change. They created a critical mass and displayed a "readiness for spontaneous revolutionary actions". A showdown may yet come between the military and the demonstrators, but will the conscript army follow the orders of the generals, or the will of the people?
In Russia, that was the difference between December,1905 & February,1917.

[Eugene Ivanov]

Joe,

I'm 100% with you here. But it took a few months to finish what the Ferbuary 1917 Revolution had started -- and the result was far from the originally intended.

So let's wait and see -- that's the only thing that I suggest. By any means do I want to downplay people's "readiness for spontaneous revolutionary actions." What I do have an aversion to is to calling every popular movement a "revolution" and a "pro-democracy." As far as the "pro-democracy" part goes, I don't have any idea which fraction of the society the protesters represent. Take a look, for example, at this piece in TNI: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/what-egyptians-really-want-4864. The guy pretty much shares my concerns.

Best,
Eugene

[Sergey]

There is a clear link from Russia to Egypt: summer fires lead to export ban, Egypt was supposed to get upwards of half a million tons of wheat, the delivery of which had to be 'rescheduled'. Some of that Egypt reportedly was able to get from France, but apparently not all of it. The food prices have been rising even without Russian embargo: see this Jan 2011 report by Credit Suisse, https://www.credit-suisse.com/news/doc/media_releases/consumer_survey_0701_small.pdf. Page 22 mentions 20% food inflation for a country where 41% of all expenditures is on food. Or this report from Aug 22, 2010, http://bikyamasr.com/wordpress/?p=15983. A quote: "Egypt’s Central Bank has reported that ahead of the holy month of Ramadan, the prices of poultry, red meat and rice increased dramatically in July. The announcement is no surprise for consumers, who have repeatedly said prices are sky-rocketing."

Who knows which straw has broken camel's back, but Russian influence definitely wasn't removing them.

What about Egypt affecting Russia? Why, Brent oil is at $103, couldn't have been more conductive to a revolution, right?

Some other components of Egyptian revolt. Educated youth, with estimated 20% unemployement rate. A lot of them: Under 15 years old are 33% of Egyptian population (only 15% in Russia). Median age is just 24.8 years in Egypt (38.4 in Russia)! Data is from http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/topic.jsp?i=102&srt=1

Don't forget: in Egypt a young male needs money to marry. There's a lot of them, poverty is widespread: 18.5% living on less that 2$ a day (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_percentage_of_population_living_in_poverty), and so many simply wouldn't be able to afford marriage. Egypt is a socially conservative country, remember? So, a lot of young, educated, unemployed, poor and probably sexually frustrated people after a major price shock to their main expenditure category - tension was very high, revolt has happened.

Now, which part of that mixure is present in Russia? Not too many young, and the numbers are going down (very small 90s generations are entering adulthood). Well educated, yes, but without large unemployment (probably overqualified, but not doing Herbalife any longer). Social lifts are clogged, true. Sexually repressed? Give me a break. Well... we are going to wait for that revolution in Russia for a long, long, long time, I guess.

[Eugene Ivanov]

Sergey,

Thanks very much for your comments. As far as I'm concerned, I'm in no ruch for another Russian revolution.

What triggered this post was in part an article in BNE:

http://www.bne.eu/story2470/MOSCOW_BLOG_The_risk_of_democratisation_in_Russia

Take a look at Fig. 3. According to this criterion, Russia is better off than even Slovakia. Interestingly, at the far right of this scale ("Greatest risk of unrest") are Iran and Kuwait. Iran is on already. Will Kuwait follow or it will be spared by its per-capita GDP?

Anyway, I felt that judging Russia using the "Middle East" approach was unfair. So I turned to Lenin. Still works, does it not?

Best Regards,
Eugene

[Sergey]

Hi Eugene,

No way Kuwait is going to explode anytime soon - by Constitution, every citizen has a right to a job. When such a citizen, often with a degree from a Western U. paid for by the government, arrives home to request the job, another desk is put into one of the ministries or agencies, and some of the papers to be pushed start arriving on that desk.

So, yes, a lot of young people, but a total lack of young, unemployed, and unmarried ones.

South Africa and especially Kenya have experiences 'revolutions' recently, Pakistan has a set of never-ending conflicts as a safety valve. As long as Saudi Arabia got funds to pay off its citizens, it's safe too.

BNE should have added a few other factors into their model, Gini coefficient and macro volatility come to mind immediately. Or share of transfers in the budget.

On Lenin - trouble with any social science (including economics) is that it's very hard to reject a hypothesis. So, yes, perhaps it still works.

[Eugene Ivanov]

Thanks Sergey,

Funny, a college friend of mine in St. Petersburg (a member of unregistered Ryzhkov's Republican Party) told me recently that days and nights, he's reading Lenin's "Государство и революция." So finally, he got to appreciate what he, me and many others loved to mock just a few (about 40) years ago...

Best,
Eugene

[Quetzalcoatl]

In Kuwait and other Gulf states employment means spending time at the shopping malls all day. (Unless you are a guest worker from Bangladesh, where you are treated as a slave.) That does not look good for the long term of these states.

I think it is interesting that the Maghreb has so many young people, but birth rates are already below replacement level in those countries. I wonder if the chaos will lead to everyone-for-sale climate of EE despite the Islamic background. Egypt - while not in the Maghreb - has more in common with them since they cannot rely on oil prices (I wonder if low oil prices may have had something to do with the very large baby boom in this region in the 80s.)

[Eugene Ivanov]

Dear Quetzalcoatl,

Thank you very much for your comments. Again, I'm not an expert in the region and don't know well the difference in economic and political situation between all these countries. Yet, with all differences, it does appear that the unrest is spreading around, albeit being restricted so far to the least prosperous countries. So it is important to understand what is driving these protests.

What was interesting though to watch is the reaction of the Obama administration to the protests in Egypt vis-a-vis Iran: very cautious approach in the first case and an unconditional support for "democracy" in the second.

Best Regards,
Eugene

[Sergey]

Dear Eugene,

"to friends everything, to enemies democracy?" :)

Best,
Sergey

[Luis Alcalá]

An interesting article about the Clinton doctrine.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/2011222101415541965.html