The Ivanov Report

The Iran Syndrome

The U.S.' obsessive media coverage of Iran puzzles me.  I see no reason why the disputed presidential election and the following violent street protests in Tehran should be treated as a major world event.  Even the expected North Korean launch of a ballistic missile toward Hawaii has suddenly become less threatening to U.S. national security than the prospect of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remaining the Iranian president for another 4 years.

Why all this fuss about Iran?

We're being told that the results of the election have been "stolen."  (Although signs of massive election fraud in favor of Ahmadinejad is impossible to ignore -- even the Guardian Council has tacitly acknowledged that -- there is no evidence, either, of the victory of his major rival, Mir Hossein Mousavi).  So?  Elections are being stolen everywhere.  Some irresponsible folks even claimed that a presidential election was stolen in the United States in 2000.   What should one then expect from Iran, with its lack of democratic traditions and a murky political process?  Besides, one of our best friends, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, doesn't allow any elections at all; yet I don't remember this fact being chewed up by political analysts 24/7.

We're also being told that after all, it's not about elections, but rather about "freedom and democracy."  I'm all for freedom and democracy, but I simply want to make sure that we're talking exactly about those two things.  For now, what I see on my TV screen is a crowd of people wearing green ribbons and scarfs -- and we all know that in this part of the world, green doesn't symbolize clean energy -- setting on fire trash cans, bicycles, and buses and chanting "Allah Akbar" and "Death to Dictator" (please, note: not "Down with Dictator" and not "Trial for Dictator", but  "Death to Dictator").   

(True, we also see "Where is my vote?" signs in English, reminding me of Russian "democrats" who always switch to English before being arrested for violation of public order.)

I thus applaud the honesty of the former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, who in his June 21 interview with Fox News spared us from pulling a fast one about freedom and democracy and called for what he and his neocon pals have been calling all along: the "regime change" in Iran.

The major reason why so many in Washington cannot take their eyes aways from the images of Iran is that deep down, they dream that the street protests in Tehran will miraculously morph into the 2003 Rose Revolution in Tbilisi or the 2004 Orange Revolution in Kiev, eventually transforming Iran into a U.S.-friendly state.  A "reformer" Mir Hossein Mousavi as an Iranian Mikheil Saakashvili? Or Victor Yushchenko?  Wouldn't that be great? 

The Tbilisi allusion is especially appealing.  Here we have the Georgian president Saakashvili who, in November 2007, sent riot police to violently disperse peaceful street protesters and then, in January 2008, won a second term in office in what many in Georgia called  a "rigged" election.  

Since the beginning of April, the opposition to the Saakashvili regime has been holding street protests accusing Saakashvili of creating a "police state."  Our reaction?  We have assured him of our support and pretty much told the opposition to get lost.

(A lesson to all aspiring leaders of "democratic" states:  attend Columbia University and speak "fluent English").

The Iran media coverage serves one additional, however tactical, purpose: it allows the media to ignore the recently increased violence in Iraq, a country that is an Exhibition A of our "freedom and democracy" export project.

Medvedev's Foreign Policy "Style"

This article was first published on Vladimir Frolov's Russia Profile Weekly Expert Panel (June 11, 2009):

Vladimir Frolov, uses President Medvedev’s 2008 initiative to overhaul the existing security system in Europe as an example of what is wrong with Medvedev’s style in foreign policy: “vaguely worded” statements, “poor attention to detail”, and “a lack of follow-up.” 

I agree with Vladimir on that.  But is this style unique to Medvedev?  Can anyone point to a single specific, well-articulated, and followed-through major foreign policy initiative originated by Medvedev’s predecessors, presidents Yeltsin and Putin?  (I’m not denying, of course, that some Putin’s foreign policy statements were worded in a very “non-vague” fashion).  

Medvedev’s “style” in foreign policy is a reflection, first and foremost, of the fundamental problem plaguing Russia’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War: the lack of geostrategic vision, perennial defensiveness, poor record of planning and executing specific foreign-policy projects, and inability to support foreign policy initiatives with “informational warfare.”

Making things worse, Medvedev is an ultimate “domestic” president.  Groomed for the presidency largely through being in charge of “national projects”, Medvedev didn’t have any solid foreign policy experience and apparently needed intense on-job training during last year’s war with Georgia.    

Given the circumstances, instead of criticizing Medvedev for a vaguely worded proposal on the new security architecture in Europe, one should applaud him for actually coming up with the idea.  For this is not only his first major foreign policy initiative, this is the first proposal of this magnitude coming out of Moscow in, perhaps, a good 20 years.

True, the Russian Constitution charges the president with special responsibilities in conducting foreign policy, yet one can hardly expect Medvedev or his administration to put on paper and/or specify every proposal he spells out.  This is a job for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this is where the problem seems to reside as Medvedev appears to have no real control over the huge MID bureaucracy.

In order to bring about real change – and not just in his “style”, but, rather, in the very substance of Russia’s foreign policy – Medvedev has to dramatically revamp his foreign policy team.  A good start would be to fire his Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov -- something I first called for about a year ago.

Lavrov was appointed in 2004 by then-president Putin and has apparently missed the fact that effective May 2008, he is supposed to report to another boss.  But this is only a secondary problem with Lavrov.  The major one is that having spent the bulk of his diplomatic career in the United States, Lavrov tends to reduce Russia’s foreign policy to its relations with the U.S. (Even worse, during last year’s war with Georgia, Lavrov behaved as if his personal relationship with then-U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, was at the core of U.S.-Russia relations).

The Russian foreign policy cannot remain a hostage of the results of the Medvedev-Obama summits or – on a larger scale – of the outcome of U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations.  It must become multidirectional, pro-active, flexible, and perfectly balanced in applying both “hard” and “soft’” power.

However, even with a new, young, and energetic, foreign policy team in place, putting meat on the bones of Medvedev’s Europe security proposal wouldn’t be my first priority.  Much more urgent is the designing of a comprehensive, coherent, and goal-oriented Russian policy in the post-Soviet space -- in particular, in Ukraine and Georgia. 

 

Pravda On The Potomac-5 (What The Washington Post Wrote About Russia In May 2009)

For the second month in a row, I have to use an adjective to describe the Post's coverage of Russia.  In April, it was "bland."  This month's adjective is "anemic": for the whole month of May, the Post has published a meager eight Russia-related articles and op-eds.

On the reporting side, Philip Pan continued doing a good job of writing about real events in real Russia populated with real Russians.  On May 26, he wrote about the hardship faced by Russia's officer corps being laid-off from the service as a result of the ongoing military reform.  Pan's article on May 28 suggested that Russia was apparently losing its patience with North Korea after the latter tested a nuclear device on May 24.  Pan also reported about  the opening of a plant in Siberia to destroy a stockpile of about 2 million chemical munitions.  Conceived in 1999 as part of the Nunn-Lugar program, the project has received $1 billion in U.S. aid.

Mary Beth Sheridan reported, on May 8, on the formal start, in New York, of talks aimed at renewing the START treaty -- and of the struggle by the State Department "to expand its team of arms-control specialists, depleted by retirements and the departure of several senior officials who felt politically sidelined."

On May 19, Joby Warrick and R. Jeffrey Smith wrote about  a report issued by a team of U.S. and Russian non-proliferation experts.  According to this report, "it would be more than five years before Iran is capable of building both a nuclear warhead and a missile capable of carrying it over long distances."  Warrick and Smith further quote the report as saying that "if Iran were to build a nuclear-capable missile that could strike Europe, the defense shield proposed by the United States could not engage that missile."

Sarah Schafer's article on May 31 expressed fear that the economic crisis may put an end to Russia's souvenir industry, including the production of legendary matryoshkas.  One line in the article made me smile:

"A beloved children's toy in the Soviet era, when the state economy provided consumers with few choices, the matryoshka became less popular in Russia after the economy opened up."

As a child of "the Soviet era", I remember my toy box filled with toy soldiers, pistols, rifles, and cars of various sizes, colors, and degree of ugliness.  But never in my life did I have a matryoshka or see a Russian kid playing with one.

Only two articles were produced by the Post's editors and op-ed contributors.  (This is compared to 10-12 per month in January-March and 8 in April).  

On May 7, Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) and Rep. David Dreier (R-CA) used the Post's pages to announce their intention to introduce a non-binding resolution calling for a free-trade agreement with Georgia.  So? Congress stamps out non-binding resolutions by the dozen.  Why an op-ed in the Post?  It seems that Kerry and Dreier just wanted to say that the free-trade agreement between Georgia and the United States must not be considered as Russia-unfriendly.  Moreover, Kerry and Dreier called on Russia -- and I happen to support them on that --  to follow suit and lift the embargo on Georgian agricultural products:

"Economic prosperity has a way of spreading throughout both sides of a trading relationship and may offer the best long-term solution to forging some form of reconciliation between Georgia and Russia."

Exactly!  And the more the United States tries to penetrate Georgia's economy, the more reasons Russia has to do the same.  

As a general who lost his troops, the editor of the editorial page, Fred Hiatt, was the only warrior to drum the topic that is becoming central to the Post's coverage of Russia: the "deteriorating" situation with human rights.  In his May 11 article, "Dangerous Work in Moscow", Hiatt  profiles a human rights activist in Moscow, Tanya Lokshina.  I'm not even sure that Hiatt was interested in Lokshina herself, because all he seemed to want to say was this:

"As the Obama administration prepares for a July summit at the Kremlin, the nature of the Russian regime and the possibility of constructive cooperation with it are very much up for debate. Pessimists note that the regime is more opaque than ever -- outsiders do not know even whether the president, Dmitry Medvedev, wields real power -- while its army is illegally occupying parts of neighboring Georgia. Optimists say that recent official statements indicate an eagerness for better relations with the United States."

There is obviously little doubt about which side the Post is on in this "debate."