The Ivanov Report

Reloading Time: How Many Buttons Do We Need To Reset U.S.-Russia Relations

The world holds its breath while watching two unclenched fists, in Washington and in Moscow, reaching for the reset buttons.

The catchy term "the reset button" that Vice President Joe Biden coined at this year's Munich Security Conference has completely eclipsed his speech and created an impression that it was all about U.S.-Russia relations.  It was not.  First and foremost, Biden's address has been an eloquent call to restore the trans-Atlantic dialogue damaged by the foreign policy unilateralism of the Bush administration.  Speaking directly to the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy-- the leaders of two European countries most critical of the United States in the past -- Biden told them exactly what both wanted to hear:

"[W]e will engage.  We will listen.  We will consult."

The Russian leadership would be wise to pay attention to this part of Biden's speech.  The Kremlin should realize that one of the reasons why Russia wasn't isolated or even sanctioned in the aftermath of the August war with Georgia was Russia's ability to play up the differences between the United States and the countries of "Old" Europe.  True, these differences are real and won't go away simply because of a change of a tone.  Yet, should the Obama administration succeed in bringing Washington, Berlin, and Paris closer together, Russia's space for maneuvering  in its relations with the West will shrink precipitously.

I find it remarkable that ten months into his presidency -- and getting ready for his first face-to-face meeting with Obama in London, in April -- President Medvedev hasn't delivered a single policy message articulating his vision of the future of U.S.-Russia relations.  Unless you count his largely PR appearance before the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, in November, as one.

Early on, Medvedev made it clear that he wasn't going to waste his time building any meaningful relationship with the outgoing President Bush.  At the same time, he used every opportunity to publicly criticize the United States for fomenting the world economic crisis and for political and military support of the Saakashvili regime in Georgia. 

Medvedev's hostile attitude toward Washington culminated in his state-of-the-nation address, on November 5,  when he promised to deploy short-range missiles in the Kaliningrad region of Russia to neutralize American BMD systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.  The timing of this statement -- just hours after Obama's electoral victory was announced -- led to suggestions that Medvedev's message was intentionally unfriendly and even "provocative." 

Then, Medvedev has made a sudden U-turn.  Addressing the CFR audience just ten days later, he expressed Russia's desire to return to a constructive dialog with the United States.  In particular, Medvedev spoke positively of the "U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration" -- signed by then-Presidents Bush and Putin in Sochi, in April 2008 -- which, in his words, "reflects all what has happened in Russia-US relations over eight years." 

And here is my point.  The whole foundation of U.S.-Russia relations, on the Russian side of it -- with all its achievements (however meager) and formidable problems -- has been built by Putin, with Medvedev having no visible imprint on it.

This is especially troubling, given the wide-spread belief, in the West, that the real decision-making power in Russia, including in the international area, rests with Putin.  Medvedev cannot risk undermining the impact of his maiden meeting with the U.S. president by allowing members of Obama's entourage to even question Medvedev's authority to make independent foreign policy decisions.  

(After his return from Munich, Biden sat down with The Washington Post's David Broder.  Here is a line from Broder's report:

 "Biden said that there is a desire in both capitals [Washington and Moscow] to find a mechanism for continuing bilateral negotiations, but that no specific arrangements will be made until Obama meets with Putin."

Biden's propensity for gaffes is well known.  However, if he's unsure whom his boss is going to meet with, then what about the rest of the Washington foreign policy crowd?)

To "insert" himself into the cockpit of U.S.-Russia negotiation jet -- and, yes, to silence any whispers about who's in control -- Medvedev should give an interview to a top U.S. media outlet and present in depth his position on all major aspects of the relationship.

In addition, as I argued before, it's time for Medvedev to bring new faces to the Smolensky Square and to replace Sergey Lavrov, Russia's Foreign Minister, who's been on the job since 2004 and needs some rest.  This might be temporally inconvenient given Lavrov's already planned meeting, in March, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.  But who said that reloading is always convenient?  

The dialog between Washington and Moscow is too important to rely on one reset button.  It takes two to tango.  It takes two buttons to reset the U.S.-Russia relations. 

Pravda On The Potomac-1 (What The Washington Post Wrote About Russia In January 2009)

The Washington Post's January 2009 coverage of Russia was impressive: according to my back-of-the-envelope calculation, a total of 27 reports, editorials, and op-eds were published.  Hardly any other foreign country was blessed with such attention.

(Naturally, I'm talking only about topics related to political and economic developments in Russia.  I'm leaving aside travel book reviews, however politicized, another merciless beating of a Russian female tennis player at the hands of the magnificent Serena Williams, or perpetual marvels at the performance of Washington Capitals' Alex Ovechkin.)  

The Post's January reporting was dominated by Philip Pan's coverage of the gas standoff between Russia and Ukraine.  In a span of three weeks, Pan produced a whopping 14 articles about the politically charged conflict, with his first piece appearing in the early hours of January 1. 

Pan is a fine journalist, and his reporting is crisp, informative, professional and (almost) unbiased.  In the future, however, he might be better served with relying on his own research, rather than on opinions of "guest experts" such as Lilia Shevtsova of Carnegie Moscow Center.  In Pan's January 8 report, Shevtsova insinuated that Russia's prime-minister Vladimir Putin was using the gas conflict to "distract" the Russian public from the economic slowdown. 

Pan's last article on the subject was on January 20; the same day, he reported on double murder, in Moscow, of a human rights lawyer, Stanislav Markelov, and a journalist, Anastasia Baburova.

A few staff writers have contributed, too.  Joel Garreau took on Igor Panarin on January 3 (I wrote about this piece previously).  Walter Pincus highlighted, on January 5, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' renewed optimism about the future of U.S.-Russia cooperation on counterterrorism.  Karla Adam reported, on January 22, on Alexander Lebedev's acquisition of London's Evening Standard.  Finally, on January 29, Carrie Johnson told a bizarre story of an imprisoned ex-CIA spy, Harold J. Nicholson,  who used his son to collect $35,000 in "back payment" from the Russian intelligence services.  

Yet, it's not for the original reporting on Russia that the Post has earned its nickname "Pravda on the Potomac."  No, it's the hard work of its editors and op-ed contributors that is maintaining the newspaper's image of a mouthpiece of anti-Russian lobby in the United States.

It didn't take long for the Post to publish its first diatribe of the year.  On January 2, an editorial under the headline "Mr. Putin's Bailout.  As Russia's economy crashes, No. 1 looks out for himself" informed us that the Kremlin's "crisis strategy...is aimed at rescuing one man -- Mr. Putin -- and banks more on political repression than monetary tools." 

The editorial expressed concern with a new constitutional amendment extending the presidential term from four to six years; it interpreted this piece of legislation as Putin's attempt, "in the near future", to "retake the presidential office before Russians fully feel the effects of the country's" worsening economic conditions.  The logic of this statement baffles me.  I could understand it if Putin pushed for a law allowing him to immediately retire in the Bahamas.  By why would he want to change one top office for another to escape the anger of ordinary Russians?  Besides, being already in the second month of "the near future", it's worth noticing that Putin is still in the White House, and President Medvedev is still in the Kremlin. 

The editorial also criticized -- and rightfully so -- a government draft law on treason and espionage.  Since then, President Medvedev authorized his administration to dramatically rework the draft.  But don't expect the Post to tell its readers about this apparently insignificant development.

The next day, the Post -- as if running out of ideas -- suddenly assaulted French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, for showing "weakness in handling Russia" and "kowtowing to Moscow." La voila!  

The Post regained its footage on January 8,  when it compared Russia's cutoff of gas deliveries to Ukraine to Russia's invasion of Georgia last August.  The editorial went on by saying that the Kremlin's "...real aim [of the cutoff] is to advance Russia's aggressive strategy of using its energy exports to divide Europe and undermine those states it still considers its rightful subjects."  Sounds like 2006?  It sure does, and I wouldn't blame the newspaper for that: in tough economic times, recycling garbage makes economic sense. 

The Post's editors weren't done with Russia until January 20, when they used the tragic death of Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova as a reason to spit another dose of anti-Russian venom.  This time, they recycled their favorite list of "victims of the Putin regime."  Although some names on it look familiar -- Viktor Yushchenko, Anna Politkovskaya, and Alexander Litvinenko --  the addition to the list of Karina Moskalenko was somewhat surprising, given that her alleged "mercury poisoning in Strasbourg,  France, in October" was a petty accident at best.  Eh, well, the list of Putin's victims can only grow.  Just like kids.

The editorial then made a remarkable confession:

It is possible that Mr. Putin and his security services had nothing to do with any of these murders.

Wow!  What is the point then?  The point is that if you are to believe the Post, Putin had created a "political climate" in which all these real and unreal "murders" occurred.

(That, I guess, begs a larger question: to what extent is a leader of a country responsible for the violent crimes taking place there?  Are we to hold responsible presidents Clinton and Bush for creating a "climate" in which massacres at Columbine and Virginia Tech became possible?)

Russia uber-basher, Anne Applebaum, has added some spice, too, as usual.  She began, on January 13, with an op-ed about the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine.  Sharing with the Post's editors a habit of not reading what the newspaper's own journalists report, Applebaum first called "exceptionally hollow" claims that Ukraine "is not paying a fair price" for its gas.  She proceeded with a suggestion that "the Russians...wanted the lights to start going out in Bratislava or Brindisi, just to give everyone a scare."   She concluded with a call on the European Union to launch a Holy Energy War against "unreliable" Russians.    

Applebaum's next exercise in creative Russia writing came on January 27, as she set out to criticize "negative...foreign response to Obama's inauguration." Do you think that Applebaum began with her husband, Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski, who joked that Barack Obama's grandfather was a cannibal and ate a Polish missionary?  Do you think that she disapproved of a Polish parliamentarian, Arthur Gorski, who called President Obama "black crypto-communist" and further complained that Obama's election "is a disaster, it is the end of the white man's civilisation"?  Think again.  Applebaum got upset because Pravda.ru called Obama's presidency "a sham."  

(Applebaum admitted that she had chosen this quote "selectively."  And I understand why: in a Freudian slip of the mind, she was subconsciously driven to soulmates.)

Then, there was Robert Amsterdam who, on January 27, wrote an op-ed under the tasteful headline "Partners in Crime.  Why Lawlessness Works for Chaves and Putin."  Amsterdam has recently visited Venezuela to attend "a congress of student leaders."  Being apparently unable to resist the urge to boast about his bravery -- but, at the same time, eager to maintain his reputation as a Russia "expert" -- Amsterdam came up with an awkward hybrid, in which he attempted to prove that the "shooting of Politkovskaya" in 2006 and "510 violent deaths" in Venezuela in December 2008 alone was conceptually the same thing.

Linking Putin to places of Amsterdam's international travel is an interesting approach.  I strongly suspect that should Amsterdam visit Romania, he'll compare Putin to Count Dracula.

The last in line was David Ignatius who, on February 1, presented an account of Putin's speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos.  Sure, Ignatius reminded us that Putin was "an ex-KGB man", but,  remarkably enough, he did so only after describing what Putin had to tell to the audience.  Let me repeat: Ignatius first described Putin's speech and only after mentioned Putin's KGB background.

A strange man he is, this David Ignatius.