The Ivanov Report

Съезд Победителей (The Congress Of The Victors)

The Russian media has long dubbed Congresses of the ruling United Russia party "Съезды Победителей" ("The Congresses of the Victors") -- in a not so subtle allusion to the 17th Congress (1934) of the Communist Party.  Although comparing Stalin's VKP(b) to Putin's UR might be a dubious exercise, academically speaking, calling edinorosses victors hardly is.  There is little doubt that when United Russia's leadership began, a few months ago, preparing for the last week's 10th Congress, "Съезд Победителей" was exactly a bell ringing in their minds.

And, boy, did they have no reasons to feel victorious?  A year ago, Russia's most popular politician, Vladimir Putin, came to the party's helm and led it to a whopping 64 percent of the popular vote in the Duma election, giving United Russia the constitutional majority of 315 (of 450) Duma seats.  117 of 168 senators in the Federation Council, the upper chamber of parliament, are members of the party.  United Russia has factions in all 83 regional parliaments, and in 79 of them, it holds at least a simple majority.

 

And yet, the mood among 500 delegates of the Congress was far from jubilant.  Russia is in the midst of a severe financial crisis, which is rapidly turning into an all-out economic crisis.  The victors have suddenly realized that as the "leading political force of the country", it's their job to deal with the crisis and face its inevitably negative political and social consequences.  

 

At the centerpiece of the Congress was a speech given by the party's Chairman and the current prime minister, Vladimir Putin.  Putin even didn't pretend that he was delivering a "political" speech.  It was a tough crisis management talk, and in its intensity, it reminded me of Winston Churchill's inspirational addresses to the nation during the Wold War II. 

 

The package of Putin's specific anti-crisis solutions included both liberal, free-market, proposals(reduction in corporate taxes and deregulation of small business) and old-fashioned state intervention aimed at protecting domestic producers, especially in the agrarian sector ("...protectionism, as a temporary measure, is quite acceptable").  What seemed to unite both approaches is the Kremlin's desire to prevent, at any cost, massive job losses due to the economic downturn.  Added to that was Putin's promise to increase, effective January 1, unemployment benefits.  This gave an impression that it was images of angry crowds of unemployed people splashing into the streets of Russian cities that keeps Putin awake at nights.

It was only at the very end of Putin's speech that he decided to utter a couple of words about "ideology" (although he hadn't used this word at all during his speech) and mentioned briefly United Russia's passion for the "values of Russian patriotism."  Here, Putin might have misspoken: according to Boris Gryzlov, the Chairman of United Russia's Supreme Council, the ideology of United Russia is "Russian conservatism."

The 10th Congress has failed again to adopt a new party program, a clear indication of a sense of uncertainty, or even loss, within the party with regards to its ideological identity.  For years, edinorosses, ever busy with lobbying for corporate interests, have been able to pretend that talk about "centrism" could replace the need for having a true ideology.  Not anymore.  As the deep economic crisis is engulfing Russia, United Russia is falling into a deep crisis of its own: a crisis of identity. 

In April 2005, 21 representatives of the so-called liberal wing of United Russia issued a manifesto, in which they warned the party and the country about increasing attacks on "liberal values" and growing "authoritarianism and the power of bureaucracy."  United Russia's "liberals" called on their colleagues to intensify efforts at developing party program attractive to voters: 

"We believe that democratic values, civic freedoms, and sovereignty of the country must become ideological basis of the United Russia party."

The "liberal revolt" was mercilessly crashed by the party leadership, with victorious Gryzlov having famously noted: "We Bears [United Russia's symbol] need no wings."  Does Gryzlov feel victorious today?

 

 

U-Turn

There are two major schools of thought in Washington with regards to U.S.-Russia relations.  The first maintains that the principal impediment to productive U.S.-Russia cooperation is a "value gap" manifested as disagreements between the two countries on the issues of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy.  Unless this "gap" is bridged, the disciples of this school insist, any meaningful cooperation is impossible. 

The supporters of the second school, the so-called realists, argue that American interests will be better served by adopting a quid pro quo-styled approach: the United States should get from Russia what it needs, while largely ignoring Russia's digressions.  "Selective engagement" and/or "selective cooperation" are frequently used terms associated with this approach. 

Writing for the November/December 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations' Stephen Sestanovich has performed a remarkable feat: he married both approaches.  While putting blame for the deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations, in recent years, on the growing "value gap", Sestanovich still sees no reason why the two countries could not cooperate on important issues.

Sestanovich makes an interesting point by claiming that back in 2002 -- in the aftermath of the United States' bombing of Serbia, abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and presiding over NATO expansion into Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- Moscow had every reason to be unhappy with Washington.  Yet U.S.-Russia relations were at their zenith, with Bush and Putin professing mutual friendship on every occasion.  What has happened since then, asks Sestanovich?  Why are the recent developments -- the recognition of Kosovo's independence, plans to deploy anti-missile defense in Europe, and attempts to admit Ukraine and Georgia into NATO -- are being met with such a ferocious Russian opposition? 

Sestanovich's explanation is simple: in 2002, the Russian leadership saw "value" in close relations with the United States and was ready to consider "disagreements" as secondary issues.  However, since then, Moscow has decided that its partnership with Washington will never be one of equals "and that Russia would better serve its interests if it followed its own course."  In other words, Sestanovich believes that U.S.-Russia relations have come to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War because Russia has chosen to withdraw from the relations.

Interestingly, in this assertion, Sestanovich echoes the "strategic withdrawal" idea articulated by Charles King in the same issue of Foreign Affairs.

As I argued a couple of weeks ago,  recent statements by the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, showed little indication that Russia wants back into the relations.  Medvedev used every opportunity to publicly blast the United States for fomenting the August crisis in the Caucasus and unleashing the world economic downturn.  Medvedev's hostile attitude toward Washington culminated in his state-of-the-nation address, on November 5,  when he promised to deploy short-range missiles in the Kaliningrad region of Russia to neutralize U.S.' anti-missile defense systems in Poland and Czech Republic.  The timing of this statement -- just hours after election of Barack Obama as new president of the United States -- led to suggestions that Medvedev's message was intentionally unfriendly and even "provocative." 

Surprisingly, in just a few days -- and without any apparent reason -- Medvedev made a U-turn.  Speaking at a meeting of European business leaders in Cannes, on November 13, he spoke of the future of U.S.-Russia relations in unexpectedly positive terms.  The "new" Medvedev defined the relations as "the factor of global politics", called them one of Russia's foreign policy "priorities", and advocated a speedy meeting with Obama.  Sporting his newly-acquired desire to leave the troubled past behind, Medvedev observed:

"Currently, we don't have such problems and crises as in the past ... when there was a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Everything is different.  And Russia is different.  Russia is not the Soviet Union."

Two days later, on November 15, Medvedev had another chance to opine on the subject -- when addressing the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington.  Facing a civilized, if not overly friendly, audience, Medvedev gave a civilized, if not too substantive, speech, in which he again highlighted Russia's desire to build (re-build?) constructive relations with the United States.

There was a certain symbolism in the fact that Medvedev's appearance before the Council was mediated by Madeleine Albright, the former Secretary of State in Bill Clinton's administration (and former Sestanovich's boss) and a close confidant of Sen. Hillary Clinton.  Sen. Clinton may well become Secretary of State in the Obama administration.  If true, Albright's pointed, no-nonsense, questions for Medvedev could have been tasty samplers of a dish Medvedev will be served in just a few months.  A dish called the Obama administration's Russian policy. 

 

 

Medvedev's Political Reforms: A Missed Opportunity?

(A slightly different version of this post was published on Russia Profile)

Political reforms introduced by then-President Putin in the aftermath of the Beslan tragedy, in September 2004, have made Russia’s democratic institutions more dependent on the Kremlin, more hospitable to the incumbency, and, ultimately, less competitive.  Unfortunately, Constitutional amendments and changes to the electoral law proposed by President Medvedev in his first state-of-the-nation address will do little to challenge this status quo. 

Without any pretense of the exhaustive analysis of Medvedev's proposals, I'd like to discuss a few controversial provisions.

1.

Medvedev’s initiative to extend the presidential term to six years and the Duma deputy terms to five years appears to be a step in the wrong direction.  Extending elected officials’ terms without imposing term limits means fewer elections.  Fewer elections mean less political competition.  It’s that simple. 

As of today, the Russian electorate is not overwhelmed with election campaigns, which, when taking place, are short and non-eventful, if not outright boring.  If nothing else, more frequent elections in Russia could help awaken the disengaged and apathetic electorate.

2.

At first glance, the suggestion to allocate one or two “fixed” Duma seats to political parties which gained 5 to 7 percent of the popular vote (just below of the current 7-percent threshold) looks quite democratic.  But here is the issue.  In the past Duma election, in December 2007, two political parties currently represented in the Duma, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) and Just Russia (JR) collected 8.1 and 7.7 percent of the popular vote and were subsequently allocated 40 and 38 Duma seats, respectively.  Should Medvedev’s proposal be implemented, a political party may receive only a slightly smaller percentage of the vote than, say, JR, and yet be awarded with hardly a 1/20 fraction of JR’s Duma seats.  Won’t this create an impression that some political parties (and voters supporting them) are “less equal” than others?

If President Medvedev really wants to increase party representation in the Duma, as he claims, then the most logical solution would be to reduce the electoral threshold to 5 or even 3 percent.  Yet, without giving any explanations, Medvedev called such a measure “not necessary.”

3.

The Russian electoral law openly favors incumbent (i.e. already represented in the Duma) political parties.  Medvedev’s proposals fail to address this bias.  Take his suggestion to get rid of using monetary bonds to register for elections.  It is not that this registration will be abolished at all.  No, instead of posting monetary bonds (which is at least easy if the party has money) non-incumbent parties will now have to collect supporting signatures (two million in case of Duma elections), which is cumbersome, error-prone, and open to bureaucratic harassment.  Moreover, everyone in Russia knows that these signatures are being bought -- literally bought by professional collectors who pay cash in exchange for signatures, low-income citizens like pensioners and college students being usual "donors."

The real question to ask is why a political party in good standing has to additionally register for elections in the first place?  To level the playing ground in terms of elections, a simple process could be implemented: in the year preceding Duma election, all Russian political parties go through a process of re-registration and then proceed to the election without any further preconditions.  

4.

Medvedev's proposal to introduce mandatory term limits for the leadership of political parties seems to be simply off mark.  There are no term limits for Duma deputies, senators, governors, ministers, and heads of state corporations.  Why should then the state regulate political parties, which in essense are public entities? 

5.

It is not a secret that the balance of power in Russia is heavily shifted towards the executive branch of government.  It is therefore a good idea to give the Duma some “controlling functions” (in Medvedev’s words) over the Cabinet.  A law proposed by the President would mandate annual Cabinet reports to the Duma. 

Unfortunately, Medvedev didn’t make clear what these “controlling functions” should be and how then these annual reports should be different from the current, completely toothless, “government hours.”  The new law would only be effective if it postulated that every annual report is to be followed by the Duma vote of confidence (with a simple majority needed to force the Cabinet to resign).  Otherwise, annual government reports will rapidly morph in Prime Minister Putin’s own state-of-the-nation addresses.

The State Of Withdrawal

The cover of the November/December 2008 issue of "Foreign Affairs" catches one's eye with a headline: "Checking Russia."  The burden of checking on Russia (and figuring out how to keep it in check) fell on the shoulders of Georgetown University's Charles King ("The Five-Day War.  Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis") and the Council on Foreign Relations' Stephen Sestanovich ("What Has Moscow Done").  Both provide solid analysis of the roots of the August conflict between Russia and Georgia and ponder over the future of U.S.-Russia relations in the aftermath of the conflict.

King doesn't appear to share a popular belief that by invading Georgia and recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia has condemned itself to international isolation.  He believes that there are many countries that support Russia

"...in questioning the consistency of the United States' responses to territorial conflicts around the world or the evenhandedness with which the West doles out labels such as 'democratic,' 'terrorist,' or 'rogue state.'"

King seems to be more concerned that Russia's isolation may be self-imposed.  He argues that Russia's recent actions in the Caucasus have demonstrated Moscow's "...little faith in multilateral institutions, such as the UN Security Council or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe."  He adds:

" This distrust reveals something important about Russian leaders' view of global politics in general: Russian leaders believe that the existing multilateral institutions are unsubtle fronts for promoting the naked interests of the United States and its major European allies."

In Kings's opinion, the real danger is that Russia will respond to Western criticism by withdrawingl from any cooperation with the West, a pattern of Russia's behavior that King follows from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of the Cold War.  He concludes his piece with the following pessimistic statement:

"Certainly, Russia's actions have distanced the country from Western institutions.  But the deeper worry is that the Kremlin and average Russians can now imagine a world in which they do not have to care." 

On the surface of things, there has been little evidence so far that King's bad dreams are coming true, as the Russian leadership, both President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, have flatly rejected the idea of Russia breaking up its relations with the West.  ("Self-isolation is a path to nowhere", proclaimed Medvedev in his state of the nation address; "Isolationism is absolutely not our choice", Putin told to a meeting of the Cabinet).

In an article published in October, Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, called for an immediate resumption of a "straight talk" between Moscow and Washington.  He stressed that differences in opinions shouldn't prevent both countries from cooperating on vitally important issues.

This verbal olive branch was followed by a diplomatic overture as Lavrov has announced that Russia will support an extension of the United Nations mandate (due to expire on December 31) allowing United States troops to stay in Iraq, a development that gives the Bush administration a much needed breathing space. 

(Characteristically, a Washington Post editorial -- under a tasteful headline "Rogues Gone Bust" -- has interpreted this good-will gesture as a sign of Russia's weakness.  The message of the editorial was clear: if the United States wants something from Russia, pressure must be applied.) 

And yet, the future of U.S.-Russia relations looks much bleaker than the Russian leaders' conciliatory statements  might suggest.  President Medvedev uses every opportunity to blame the United States for both fomenting the August crisis in the Caucasus and unleashing the world financial crisis.  At the same time, Medvedev doesn't fail to highlight what he considers a balanced approach to the August War demonstrated by Russia's major trading partners in Europe: France, Germany, and Italy.

Speaking at an international conference in Evian, France, Medvedev made his sympathies clear:

"Over the past two months [after the war in Georgia], we have come to see...who our friends are, and who're not."

Having hailed "brave and responsible actions" of the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, Medvedev continued:

"[I'd like to] emphasize the constructive role of the European Union in finding a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Caucasus.  When other forces showed unwillingness or inability to do so, it was the European Union that came across as a pro-active, responsible, and...pragmatic partner."

On Wednesday, delivering his first state-of-the-nation address,  Medvedev promised to send short-range missiles to the Kaliningrad region of Russia in response to the planned deployment of U.S. anti-missile defense systems in Poland and Czech Republic.  The timing of this statement -- just hours after election of Barack Obama -- led to suggestions that Medvedev's message was intentionally unfriendly and even "provocative." 

Medvedev and Obama stand a chance to meet on the sidelines of the upcoming G20  summit in Washington on November 15.  The very fact of this meeting taking place (a possibility that Obama will refuse meeting Medvedev due to a "scheduling conflict" cannot be excluded), the body language of both leaders and their comments for the media, if any, will tell volumes about how relations between two most powerful nuclear states in the world will develop.

Although Medvedev's openly anti-American stance may turn out to be a short-term, tactical, maneuver aimed at putting pressure on the new Obama administration, another possible option would be that Russia will follow a "half-King" pattern of its relations with the "West": Russia will actively cooperate with Europe, but its relations with the United States will sink in a state of withdrawal.

 

 

   

Halloween 2008

Last year, my wife and I bought a new house.  Having moved into a new neighborhood, for the second year in a row, we truly enjoy arguably the best part of Halloween: trick-or-treating.

Our previous house stood on a busy street where only a few parents would allow their kids to go to.  Only our immediate neighbors and our children's friends used to show up at the door -- to the great grief of my wife, who, being the typical Russian woman that she is, always bought more candy than we could possibly distribute.  Unused stuff polluted the house for weeks thereafter, as our kids preferred to digest their own, hardly earned, trick-or-treating loot.

Our new house sits in a cul-de-sac in a quiet upper-middle-class neighborhood near Boston.  Last year, we were almost taken off guard by the number of trick-or-treaters who chose to ring our doorbell.  The flow of visitors fortunately stopped at the moment when my wife was emptying the very last pack of candies and we were frantically counting $1 bills to cover for the rest. 

This year, we were fully prepared.  Seven 12-ounce packs of Milky Way (three), Snickers (two), and Crunch (two).  $10 total expense.

I didn't count the number of trick-or treaters last year, but it feels like yesterday, there were more kids.  No, I'm not rushing into speculation that this increase has anything to do with the ongoing economic crisis.  But I did wonder how many moms and dads of our visitors have been already affected by the wave of layoffs in Massachusetts.

As a person working for an Internet company and as a blogger, I'm used to counting "visits." So here are the stats of my personal Halloween 2008: 11 visits, 40 kids.  Four witches, three princesses, three clowns, three soccer players, two cats, two pirates, two Spidermen, a mouse, a Devil, a soccer referee,  a Sandy from the "Grease" (my wife complimented the girl's costume and suggested to take more candy.  She did with a remark: "A good costume pays off"), a Mummy, a Star Warrior, a thief, a "Halloween costume" (whatever it means), an alien, a ghost, a "happy" (whatever it means), a cheerleader, a "living death" (whatever it means), a vampire, a Dorothy from "The Wizard of Oz", a "vampirish girl" (as explained), a sorceress, and a ghost bride (a beautiful, most likely real, bride's costume).  Also three accompanying adults: a Captain Cook, a Darth Vader, and an Elvis Presley.

As the night progressed, I had a nice feeling that for the first time in weeks, the real monsters of the world -- the Obamas, the McCains, the Sarah Palins, and the Putins -- were far-far away from me and my family.  It felt wonderful.