The Ivanov Report

The Iran Syndrome

The U.S.' obsessive media coverage of Iran puzzles me.  I see no reason why the disputed presidential election and the following violent street protests in Tehran should be treated as a major world event.  Even the expected North Korean launch of a ballistic missile toward Hawaii has suddenly become less threatening to U.S. national security than the prospect of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remaining the Iranian president for another 4 years.

Why all this fuss about Iran?

We're being told that the results of the election have been "stolen."  (Although signs of massive election fraud in favor of Ahmadinejad is impossible to ignore -- even the Guardian Council has tacitly acknowledged that -- there is no evidence, either, of the victory of his major rival, Mir Hossein Mousavi).  So?  Elections are being stolen everywhere.  Some irresponsible folks even claimed that a presidential election was stolen in the United States in 2000.   What should one then expect from Iran, with its lack of democratic traditions and a murky political process?  Besides, one of our best friends, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, doesn't allow any elections at all; yet I don't remember this fact being chewed up by political analysts 24/7.

We're also being told that after all, it's not about elections, but rather about "freedom and democracy."  I'm all for freedom and democracy, but I simply want to make sure that we're talking exactly about those two things.  For now, what I see on my TV screen is a crowd of people wearing green ribbons and scarfs -- and we all know that in this part of the world, green doesn't symbolize clean energy -- setting on fire trash cans, bicycles, and buses and chanting "Allah Akbar" and "Death to Dictator" (please, note: not "Down with Dictator" and not "Trial for Dictator", but  "Death to Dictator").   

(True, we also see "Where is my vote?" signs in English, reminding me of Russian "democrats" who always switch to English before being arrested for violation of public order.)

I thus applaud the honesty of the former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, who in his June 21 interview with Fox News spared us from pulling a fast one about freedom and democracy and called for what he and his neocon pals have been calling all along: the "regime change" in Iran.

The major reason why so many in Washington cannot take their eyes aways from the images of Iran is that deep down, they dream that the street protests in Tehran will miraculously morph into the 2003 Rose Revolution in Tbilisi or the 2004 Orange Revolution in Kiev, eventually transforming Iran into a U.S.-friendly state.  A "reformer" Mir Hossein Mousavi as an Iranian Mikheil Saakashvili? Or Victor Yushchenko?  Wouldn't that be great? 

The Tbilisi allusion is especially appealing.  Here we have the Georgian president Saakashvili who, in November 2007, sent riot police to violently disperse peaceful street protesters and then, in January 2008, won a second term in office in what many in Georgia called  a "rigged" election.  

Since the beginning of April, the opposition to the Saakashvili regime has been holding street protests accusing Saakashvili of creating a "police state."  Our reaction?  We have assured him of our support and pretty much told the opposition to get lost.

(A lesson to all aspiring leaders of "democratic" states:  attend Columbia University and speak "fluent English").

The Iran media coverage serves one additional, however tactical, purpose: it allows the media to ignore the recently increased violence in Iraq, a country that is an Exhibition A of our "freedom and democracy" export project.

Medvedev's Foreign Policy "Style"

This article was first published on Vladimir Frolov's Russia Profile Weekly Expert Panel (June 11, 2009):

Vladimir Frolov, uses President Medvedev’s 2008 initiative to overhaul the existing security system in Europe as an example of what is wrong with Medvedev’s style in foreign policy: “vaguely worded” statements, “poor attention to detail”, and “a lack of follow-up.” 

I agree with Vladimir on that.  But is this style unique to Medvedev?  Can anyone point to a single specific, well-articulated, and followed-through major foreign policy initiative originated by Medvedev’s predecessors, presidents Yeltsin and Putin?  (I’m not denying, of course, that some Putin’s foreign policy statements were worded in a very “non-vague” fashion).  

Medvedev’s “style” in foreign policy is a reflection, first and foremost, of the fundamental problem plaguing Russia’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War: the lack of geostrategic vision, perennial defensiveness, poor record of planning and executing specific foreign-policy projects, and inability to support foreign policy initiatives with “informational warfare.”

Making things worse, Medvedev is an ultimate “domestic” president.  Groomed for the presidency largely through being in charge of “national projects”, Medvedev didn’t have any solid foreign policy experience and apparently needed intense on-job training during last year’s war with Georgia.    

Given the circumstances, instead of criticizing Medvedev for a vaguely worded proposal on the new security architecture in Europe, one should applaud him for actually coming up with the idea.  For this is not only his first major foreign policy initiative, this is the first proposal of this magnitude coming out of Moscow in, perhaps, a good 20 years.

True, the Russian Constitution charges the president with special responsibilities in conducting foreign policy, yet one can hardly expect Medvedev or his administration to put on paper and/or specify every proposal he spells out.  This is a job for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this is where the problem seems to reside as Medvedev appears to have no real control over the huge MID bureaucracy.

In order to bring about real change – and not just in his “style”, but, rather, in the very substance of Russia’s foreign policy – Medvedev has to dramatically revamp his foreign policy team.  A good start would be to fire his Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov -- something I first called for about a year ago.

Lavrov was appointed in 2004 by then-president Putin and has apparently missed the fact that effective May 2008, he is supposed to report to another boss.  But this is only a secondary problem with Lavrov.  The major one is that having spent the bulk of his diplomatic career in the United States, Lavrov tends to reduce Russia’s foreign policy to its relations with the U.S. (Even worse, during last year’s war with Georgia, Lavrov behaved as if his personal relationship with then-U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, was at the core of U.S.-Russia relations).

The Russian foreign policy cannot remain a hostage of the results of the Medvedev-Obama summits or – on a larger scale – of the outcome of U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations.  It must become multidirectional, pro-active, flexible, and perfectly balanced in applying both “hard” and “soft’” power.

However, even with a new, young, and energetic, foreign policy team in place, putting meat on the bones of Medvedev’s Europe security proposal wouldn’t be my first priority.  Much more urgent is the designing of a comprehensive, coherent, and goal-oriented Russian policy in the post-Soviet space -- in particular, in Ukraine and Georgia. 

 

Pravda On The Potomac-5 (What The Washington Post Wrote About Russia In May 2009)

For the second month in a row, I have to use an adjective to describe the Post's coverage of Russia.  In April, it was "bland."  This month's adjective is "anemic": for the whole month of May, the Post has published a meager eight Russia-related articles and op-eds.

On the reporting side, Philip Pan continued doing a good job of writing about real events in real Russia populated with real Russians.  On May 26, he wrote about the hardship faced by Russia's officer corps being laid-off from the service as a result of the ongoing military reform.  Pan's article on May 28 suggested that Russia was apparently losing its patience with North Korea after the latter tested a nuclear device on May 24.  Pan also reported about  the opening of a plant in Siberia to destroy a stockpile of about 2 million chemical munitions.  Conceived in 1999 as part of the Nunn-Lugar program, the project has received $1 billion in U.S. aid.

Mary Beth Sheridan reported, on May 8, on the formal start, in New York, of talks aimed at renewing the START treaty -- and of the struggle by the State Department "to expand its team of arms-control specialists, depleted by retirements and the departure of several senior officials who felt politically sidelined."

On May 19, Joby Warrick and R. Jeffrey Smith wrote about  a report issued by a team of U.S. and Russian non-proliferation experts.  According to this report, "it would be more than five years before Iran is capable of building both a nuclear warhead and a missile capable of carrying it over long distances."  Warrick and Smith further quote the report as saying that "if Iran were to build a nuclear-capable missile that could strike Europe, the defense shield proposed by the United States could not engage that missile."

Sarah Schafer's article on May 31 expressed fear that the economic crisis may put an end to Russia's souvenir industry, including the production of legendary matryoshkas.  One line in the article made me smile:

"A beloved children's toy in the Soviet era, when the state economy provided consumers with few choices, the matryoshka became less popular in Russia after the economy opened up."

As a child of "the Soviet era", I remember my toy box filled with toy soldiers, pistols, rifles, and cars of various sizes, colors, and degree of ugliness.  But never in my life did I have a matryoshka or see a Russian kid playing with one.

Only two articles were produced by the Post's editors and op-ed contributors.  (This is compared to 10-12 per month in January-March and 8 in April).  

On May 7, Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) and Rep. David Dreier (R-CA) used the Post's pages to announce their intention to introduce a non-binding resolution calling for a free-trade agreement with Georgia.  So? Congress stamps out non-binding resolutions by the dozen.  Why an op-ed in the Post?  It seems that Kerry and Dreier just wanted to say that the free-trade agreement between Georgia and the United States must not be considered as Russia-unfriendly.  Moreover, Kerry and Dreier called on Russia -- and I happen to support them on that --  to follow suit and lift the embargo on Georgian agricultural products:

"Economic prosperity has a way of spreading throughout both sides of a trading relationship and may offer the best long-term solution to forging some form of reconciliation between Georgia and Russia."

Exactly!  And the more the United States tries to penetrate Georgia's economy, the more reasons Russia has to do the same.  

As a general who lost his troops, the editor of the editorial page, Fred Hiatt, was the only warrior to drum the topic that is becoming central to the Post's coverage of Russia: the "deteriorating" situation with human rights.  In his May 11 article, "Dangerous Work in Moscow", Hiatt  profiles a human rights activist in Moscow, Tanya Lokshina.  I'm not even sure that Hiatt was interested in Lokshina herself, because all he seemed to want to say was this:

"As the Obama administration prepares for a July summit at the Kremlin, the nature of the Russian regime and the possibility of constructive cooperation with it are very much up for debate. Pessimists note that the regime is more opaque than ever -- outsiders do not know even whether the president, Dmitry Medvedev, wields real power -- while its army is illegally occupying parts of neighboring Georgia. Optimists say that recent official statements indicate an eagerness for better relations with the United States."

There is obviously little doubt about which side the Post is on in this "debate."

Pravda On The Potomac-4 (What The Washington Post Wrote About Russia In April 2009)

The Post's coverage of Russia in April was, well, bland.  I was especially disappointed with the lackadaisical efforts of the Post's editors and op-ed contributors.  It seems that they spent all their energy back in March explaining to the world why the "resetting" of U.S.-Russia relations was a bad idea.

But business means business, and here comes Jackson Diehl, who, in an April 5 op-ed, accused President Obama(whom Diehl calls "too passive, even weak") in the betrayal of "principal American concerns."  This is how Diehl interprets the decision by the Obama administration "to devote the next four months of U.S.-Russian relations to an intensive effort to complete a new START treaty [whereas no] such cooperation on Iran is on the horizon."

In Diehl's opinion, arms control negotiations with Russia don't make much sense at all, because "...strategic arms control is of much greater interest to Russia -- whose nuclear arsenal is rapidly deteriorating -- than it is to the United States." 

(On April 20, when criticizingagain Obama's foreign policy, Diehl opined that "...Russia remains determined to restore its domination over Georgia" and that "[t]he threat of another Russian attack on Georgia seems to be going up.")  

Russia's "deteriorating" nuclear arsenal and one-sided benefits from arms control negotiations are becoming recurrent themes for the Post's authors.  Anne Applebaum, in an April 7 piece, wrote that "[the Russian] government does want arms reduction talks, but only because its nuclear arsenal is rapidly deteriorating.  By agreeing to start them, we've unnecessary handed Moscow a bargaining chip." 

(Charles Krauthammer concurs: "[Disarmament] talks are a gift to the Russians for whom a return to anachronistic Reagan-era START talks is a return to the glory of U.S.-Soviet summitry."   The glory of U.S.-Soviet summitry!  Sounds like Krauthammer compares, even subconsciously, Obama to Ronald Reagan and President Medvedev to Mikhail Gorbachev.)

Applebaum's piece is actually worth reading, for she makes a number of interesting claims.  First, she seems to be asserting that Iranian nuclear weapons "are not of immediate strategic threat to Europe or the United States."  Good for her!  Second, she argues that nuclear weapons, "while terrifying in the abstract", are less dangerous than biological ("more lethal") or chemical ("far cheaper to produce").  Hmmm.  Lastly, she claims that all of the world's problems -- like "prevent[ing] large authoritarian states from invading their smaller neighbors" -- could be solved not through the arms control, but, rather, through "the promotion of democracy."  But of course. 

George Will doesn't write about Russia too often, and after reading his April 19 opus, "Potemkin Country", we should feel grateful to him for this restraint.  A brilliant point-by-point rebuttal of Will's lengthy, eclectic scribble was provided by Anatoly Karlin on his blog.  I'll only add that Will brings forward another "reason" not to engage in arms control with Russia: Russia's "deteriorating" demographic situation.  Following Will's bizarre logic, the fact that by 2030, Russia may (not will, may) lose up to 30 million of its population makes thousands of the nukes it has today irrelevant. 

Carnegie Moscow Center's Masha Lipman made her second appearance of the year.  Lipman is a fine journalist and obviously knows Russia well, but she lacks this vicious combination of arrogance and ignorance that characterizes a "typical" Russia author at the Post.  So her pieces are, honestly, boring.  In the one she published on April 8, Lipman writes about the beginning of a new trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev.  As if unsure of what to fill the editorial space with, Lipman plunges in a lengthy and repetitive description of the whole Khororkovsky affair.  (If you know the story, you don't need to read Lipman's piece; if you don't know who Khodorkovsky is, you'll fall asleep in the middle of it).  Finally, at the very end, Lipman suddenly discovers what she really wanted to say:

"Although President Medvedev claims to support the rule of law, if he continues to stay out of this affair [the trial] he will bear responsibility for Russia's continued plunge into lawlessness."    

(Lipman should try twittering.)

As if sensing that Lipman didn't do a good job, an April 11 editorial elaborated:

"Mr. Medvedev...could call for the charges against the defendants to be dropped or issue pardons to Mr. Khodorkovsky or some of his associates."

It would appear to me that, legally speaking, Medvedev cannot issue a pardon to Khodorkovsky because the latter never asked for one.  As for Medvedev calling the charges "to be dropped", is this how the Post understands judicial independence in Russia?

It definitely looks this way as Sarah Schafer -- writing about Medvedev's interview with Novaya Gazeta-- repeats the newspaper's demand for Medvedev to "call judges...to remind them they are independent."

To call judges to remind them they are independent.  Brilliant!

The other Russian guest-columnist for April, Boris Nemtsov, took time off from his campaigning for mayor of Sochi -- on the very eve of the election -- to tell the readers of the Post that "Sochi is simply not capable of hosting the Olympics."  What an optimistic statement for a person who, had he been elected, would have been responsible for the organization of the 2014 Winter Olympics and overseeing more than $12 billion of budget money.

With an attitude like this, it's little wonder that Nemtsov lost the election.  Which didn't prevent Philip Pan and Sarah Schafer from looking for the Kremlin's hand in Nemtsov's defeat.  Characteristically, Pan and Schafer filed their report from Moscow and apparently didn't interview any other candidate but Nemtsov.  (In the interview, "Nemtsov compared the tactics being used against him to those of Hitler's propaganda chief, Joseph Goebbels."  A lesson in Russia's domestic politics Pan and Schafer may want to learn: one doesn't win elections in Russia by comparing Putin to Hitler.)  

Pan does travel.  He went to Mozhaisk to write about Dmitry Belanovich, who beat a candidate from the United Russia party to become mayor of Mozhaisk.  Says Pan: "The surprise victory showed that, despite a decade of tightening political controls by the Kremlin, it is still possible to take on Putin's ruling party in a local election and prevail."  And do so without writing op-eds for the Washington Post, I'd add.

Pan then went to St. Petersburg to profile Anton Chumachenko, a young member of United Russia who won a seat on a local legislative council in St. Petersburg, but publicly renounced his victory after having learned that the vote had been falsified.

In between the trips, Pan reported on  Svetlana Bakhmina's, former lawyer for the Yukos oil company,  release from jail.

I like Pan's writings.  Although unavoidably biased (goes with the affiliation!), they report on things that do happen in Russia and matter to the majority of ordinary Russians.  But as I already mentioned, on a different occasion, the Post's editors don't seem to read what their field reporters write. 

The Lozansky Forum

Organized by its founder and spiritual leader, Edward Lozansky, the 28th World Russian Forum took place in Washington, DC on April 27-28.  It's time to give this event its proper name: The Lozansky Forum.

This year, I was able to attend only the opening day's session, which covered the most interesting (for me) topic: the present state and the future of U.S.-Russia relations.  Without any pretense of a detailed analysis, just a few thoughts.

The mood of the Forum was best summarized by the first guest-speaker, William Burns, U.S. Under Secretary of State and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia:

"Russia matters"

and

"The United States and Russia matter to one another." 

Even participants who don't count themselves among the friends of the current Kremlin regime -- and those were present in the audience too -- would nevertheless agree that the "reset" stage in U.S.-Russia relations has created a window of opportunity that cannot be let shut.

Many of the speakers argued that two areas of cooperation between the two countries -- arms control and economy, especially energy cooperation -- are particularly ripe for early progress. 

Naturally, a lot of attention was paid to the START treaty negotiations.  A consensus has emerged -- as articulated by Russian Ambassador, Sergei Kislyak, and Robert McFarlane, National Security Adviser to President Reagan -- that although it's incredibly difficult to reach a new agreement by December, when the current treaty expires, this still can be done. 

A contour of the new treaty was drawn by the Russian academic, Sergei Rogov, who suggested that the new agreement will call the two sides to limit their strategic nuclear arms to 1,500 warheads and 700-800 carriers each.  Rogov also spoke about the need to draw a road-map to achieving the complete destruction of nuclear weapons: from 2,500 to 1,500; from 1,500 to under 1,000; from under 1,000 to perhaps 500 or so; from 500 to zero(?).

Rogov was echoed by Robert Legvoldof Columbia University who asked what a strategic direction for the relationship should be and where we will find ourselves 4-6 years from now.  Legvold was joined by Thomas Pickering, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia, with a call for "ideas":

"We should again look for ideas...We'd better have a common agenda; it worked before."

Ambassador Kislyak pointed out that the volume of U.S.-Russia trade, currently at $36 billion, doesn't reflect the real potential of economic cooperation between the two countries.  (He was quick to add, with a smile, that it's still almost a 4-fold increase in just 5 years).  For the United States, Russia represents only 1 percent of the foreign trade, and the United States sits somewhere at the bottom of the list of Russia's first 10 trade partners.  Nevertheless, some positive trends seem to be forming.  The U.S. businesses have invested about $30 billion in Russia, and Russian private companies have reciprocated with about $12 billion in investments in the U.S.

Robert McFarlane suggested to revive an old project of selling liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Yamal to North America, with a potential to provide the cheapest LNG in the world.

Many speakers called on President Obama to spend some political capital on persuading Congress to ratify the so-called 123 (nuclear cooperation) Agreement and to repeal the anachronistic Jackson-Vanik amendment.

The second guest-speaker was Sen. Jim DeMint (R-SC).  It would appear that his short speech was written in the midst of the Cold War and has never been updated ever since.  A number of Russian participants were visibly impressed with the diversity of opinions.  (A journalist from Moscow asked me, during the lunch, "why wouldn't Obama just throw away the whole idea of anti-missile defense?"  I explained that Obama would face a strong opposition to such a move, including that in Congress.  The journalist grimaced and shrugged.  After DeMint's speech, our eyes met: I felt he was getting my point better now).  

The now famous Prof. Igor Panarin has also made his appearance and turned out to be much less radical, more convincing and, yes, more charming than what one would guess from his descriptions in the American media.  While gently insisting that his prognosis about America's disintegration in 2010 still stands, Prof. Panarin made it clear that he didn't want this to happen.  Instead, he'd rather attend the Lozansky Forum next year and in the years to come.  Needless to say,  Igor Nikolaevich will always be welcome in the united United States of America. 

Two last things.  First, hats off -- and many thanks -- to Edward Lozansky and his ever classy wife Tatiana for the impeccable organization of the Forum.  Second, the severe economic crisis in Russia didn't affect the quality of food and drinks served at the Russian Embassy reception Monday night. 

Sakartvelo Revisited: Russia Must Adopt A New Georgia Policy

The opposition to Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili has cornered itself by making his resignation the only demand of the street protests in Tbilisi -- and the only topic of a potential dialogue with the authorities.  Meanwhile, the protest actions organized by the opposition are rapidly losing steam, whereas Saakashvili has been much cooler under pressure than the famous tie-chewing video of him would imply.  

It's hard to say how many Georgians really want to see Saakashvili gone today, in the midst of economic crisis.  (His second -- and last -- term in office officially expires only in 2013).  It's worth remembering, however, that two previous Georgian presidents had both left office prematurely, ousted as a result of either a violent coup d'etat (Gamsakhurdia) or the fairly peacefull "Rose Revolution" (Shevardnadze).  The burden is on the opposition to explain why forcing the third president in a row out of office by force or pressure would benefit Georgia's long-term national interests -- especially in light of the opposition's loudly professed fondness of "constitutional order" and the "rule of law." 

Besides, some faces in the opposition camp can't help but raise eyebrows.  Take Irakli Alasania.  At the tender age of 35, Alasania boasts a resume full of law enforcement jobs, including a two-year stint as deputy Minister of State Security.  Everyone watching the U.N. Security Council meetings on tv during the August war between Russia and Georgia remembers Alasania, then Georgia's U.N. representative, passionately defending Saakashvili's aggression against South Ossetia.  But in December, Alasania quit his job, returned to Tbilisi, and immediately accused Saakashvili in "falling into a Russian trap."

It beats me what differences an "opposition leader" like Alasania can have with Saakashvili.  Apparently similar to those that Judas had with Jesus Christ when Jesus was arrested by temple-guards in the Garden of Gethsemane. 

Not surprisingly, Alasania and another sworn Saakashvili foe (and, naturally, his close ally in the very recent past), Nino Burjanadze, are darlings of the American media.  The Wall Street Journal has explained why: "Both speak fluent English, and want the U.S.-Georgia relationship to grow."  (Ironically, Salome Zourabichvili, a real opposition figure -- she broke with Saakashvili back in 2005 -- who also wants the U.S.-Georgia relationship to grow, is virtually unknown in the United States.  No wonder: born in Paris, Zourabichvili speaks fluent French.)

It is becoming increasingly evident that barred an unforeseen event -- like a provocation by a "rogue" opposition group followed by mass riots -- Saakashvili will successfully navigate through the rough waters of public discontent to remain in power.

And this raises an uneasy question of what Russia's policy toward Georgia should be.  For now, Russia has  poor choices.  On the one hand,  having labeled Saakasvili a "political corpse", Moscow has made it abundantly clear that, with Saakashvili in place, its dialogue with Tbilisi is out of the question.  On the other hand, Moscow should realize that all major opposition groups are as strongly anti-Russian as Saakashvili.  In other words, Russia will be facing hostile Georgian leadership until 2013 -- with Saakashvili at the helm -- or until 2014-2015, should the opposition have its way by ousting Saakashvili and holding a new presidential election. 

Russia should adopt a new Georgia policy, a policy that would temper Moscow's passion for the "regime change" in Tbilisi and would instead employ a direct outreach to Georgian people.  (Recent examples of such "over-the-head" approaches have been provided by President Barack Obama with his video message to Iranians celebrating Nowruz and easing restrictions on travel and money transfer to Cuba). 

The goal of this new policy would be preventing further alienation of Georgia's political elites and helping pro-Russian (or at least, Russia-"neutral") forces come to power during the next electoral cycle.  

The time for such an outreach is ripe.  There is a lingering feeling in Georgian political circles that Saakashvili had "overinvested" in Georgia's relations with the United States at the expense of its relations with Russia.  There is also a sober realization of the fact that with two wars and economic crisis at hand, the Obama administration will make Georgia a lesser priority than it has been for the previous administration.  Should Russia decide to unclench its fist, this move will likely be met with a guarded welcome the other side of the Caucasus mountains. 

A few concrete steps could be envisioned.  First, Russia should lift the 2006 embargo on Georgian wine and mineral water as it is only hurting its own consumers.  After all, it's little secret that the decision to impose the wine embargo, although political in its core, was heavily lobbied by Russia's beer and hard liquor manufacturers.  The immediate resumption of the cross-border trade will also be taken as a friendly gesture by many ordinary Georgians.

Second, Moscow should lift all restrictions in traveling  to Russia and resume granting working and tourist visas -- in addition to educational and "humanitarian" that it began issuing in March.  Completely visa-free travel should be allowed to Georgians having close relatives in Russia.  Entry to Russia should only be closed to top Georgian officials and all individuals suspected in planning and executing Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia.  

Third, Russia should come up with a list of bilateral business projects.  Here, soliciting advice from Kakha Bendukidze, former Russian "oligarch" and former Saakashvili state minister on economic reforms, could help.  Having been accused by the opposition in promoting "too-Russia-oriented" economic policy, Bendukidze was finally forced, in February, out of government.  He might be available, and giving him a call would be a good idea.

Lastly, when the Russian ambassador to Georgia is to return to Tbilisi, Moscow should consider replacing the current one, a career diplomat Vyacheslav Kovalenko, with a public figure who will be known to and popular with the Georgian people.  In 1991, Alexandr Bovin, a prominent journalist and TV personality, was appointed as the Russian ambassador to Israel.  Immensely popular with Israelis of Russian origin and the Israeli public at large, Bovin has profoundly contributed to improving Russia-Israel relations.

(When thinking about Alla Pugacheva who, at age 60, has just announced the completion of her outstanding artistic career, I'm only half-joking.  To be sure, Pugacheva will consider the ambassadorship to Georgia as a demotion.  But you get my point).

Recently addressing an audience at the London School of Economic and Political Science, President Medvedev spoke of "the deep-rooted friendship that has long existed between the Russian and Georgian peoples."  It would be a shame to make this friendship a hostage of a madman sitting in the presidential palace in Tbilisi.  

Pravda On The Potomac-3 (What The Washington Post Wrote About Russia In March And Early April 2009)

Not surprisingly, the Washington Post's March coverage of Russia has been an intense warm up before the April 1 meeting, in London, between presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev.  Having established itself as a major foe of the emerging U.S.-Russia dialogue, the Post didn't miss a single opportunity to try to poison the atmosphere of the first face-to-face meeting between the two leaders.   

Early attempts to undermine the summit have centered around the concept of a “grand bargain” -- a deal that Obama has supposedly offered, in a letter, to Medvedev: Russia's cooperation on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for scrapping U.S. missile defense systems in Eastern Europe.

It's worth noting that Obama’s letter to Medvedev wasn’t made public, and it's not known if any “bargain" was offered at all.  What is known is that Obama has denied the proposed Iran-MDS swap (as reported by the Post's Karen DeYoung), and so has Medvedev (as reported by the Post's Michael Fletcher).  As if grudgingly accepting this fact, a March 4 editorial proclaimed "No Deal", but still encouraged Obama to keep ignoring future Russian objections to MSD.  The editorial went a step further by suggesting that the United States should deploy a Patriot missile defense battery to Poland "regardless of what is ultimately decided about the larger missile defense system." 

Case closed?  No.  Two days later, David Kramer, a deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bush administration, decided to ride the dead horse of the "grand bargain" again.  First, he offered a somewhat unorthodox interpretation of what the "grand bargain" was:

"The "bargain" is simple: in exchange for Russian cooperation on containing the Iranian nuclear threat...the United States would... scale back its relations with Russia's neighbors...and stay quiet about Russia's deteriorating human rights situation."

(Later in the piece, Kramer thundered: "Murders of journalists and human rights activists continue with no accountability and amid a growing sense of fear. Cracking down is the only approach Russian leaders seem to know.")

Admitting that the Russia policy of the previous administration was "far from perfect", Kramer nevertheless argued that "the chief problems lie in Moscow" and that "Moscow's thinking must change if the principal source of friction between Russia and the West...is to disappear."  (Please appreciate Kramer's remarkable restraint: he didn't demand a "regime change" in Moscow.)

The conclusion of Kramer's piece is a marvel:

"Any "grand bargain" the United States makes with Russia would be viewed in Moscow as a sign of U.S. desperation.  A major American shift in missile defense policy...would be seen as a sign of weakness...Yes, the United States should work with Russia...[But] we must not bargain away...our own values."

Our own values.  Who said that the neocons as a species are extinct in Washington?

A few days later, on March 9, Robert Kagan offered a mild criticism of the Bush administration for its ignoring "the systematic dismantling of democracy in Russia."  Kagan sounded visibly upset by the fact that "the issue of democracy and human rights" doesn't feature high on Obama's foreign policy agenda.  Combining Kagan with Kramer, it would appear that the Post is determined to bring the issue of human rights in Russia to the forefront of U.S.-Russia relations.

This is interesting.  Only a year ago, there was a lively discussion in Moscow on which of the two candidates, Democrat Obama or Republican McCain, would be a "better president" for Russia.  The majority seemed to prefer Obama; yet some perceptive minds cautioned that Democrats pay too much attention to the issue of human rights, whereas Republicans are usually more "pragmatic."  A message to our friends in Moscow: the issue of "Russia's deteriorating human rights" isn't an ideological platform.  Rather, it's a bipartisan opportunistic tool.

In the meantime, on March 4, Philip Pan reported on the beginning of a new trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the trial that Pan interpreted as a "sign of internal Kremlin strife."  Pan mentioned "one of Medvedev's advisers" (naturally unnamed) who "privately expressed hope that the second trial would be dropped."

On March 6, Glenn Kessler described the meeting, in Geneva, between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov.  The same day, Ann Scott Tyson reported on the first shipment of U.S. military cargo to Afghanistan through Russia.  Tyson used the opportunity to quote Stephen Blank, "a Russia expert at the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College", who opined that Russia's "absolute priority is holding on to their sphere of influence" in Central Asia by means of "excluding the U.S."

A March 13 editorial expressed concern about the dire economic situation in Ukraine and warned the "the stakes [there] are especially high":

"The weaker and more chaotic Ukraine becomes, the likelier it is that Russia will attempt to reassert hegemony over it.  A Putinized Ukraine would be a disaster for that country, Europe and the United States."

(I guess a bankrupt Ukraine would be a lesser evil to the Post than Ukraine "putinized.")

On March 18, Philip Pan resumed his reporting from Moscow by covering President Medvedev's plans for military reform.  The same day, in an article  he co-authored with Karen DeYoung, Pan kind of resuscitated the idea of a "grand bargain" by arguing that the Kremlin was actually willing to explore a deal with Washington and was "more open to new sanctions against Iran than expected."  Pan and DeYoung quoted The Nixon Center's Dmitri Simes who met Medvedev in Moscow and who felt that the Russian leader was interested in striking a strategic quid pro quo on Iran.

On March 21, Pan covered a news conference with Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, who said that negotiations on new limits on nuclear warheads (within the framework of START talks) must be linked to the future of U.S. plans to build a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe.  Pan, however, noted that "Ryabkov stopped short of saying missile defense would be a deal-breaker for a START agreement."

It'd be naive to expect that Anne Applebaum could stay on the sidelines of the discussion.  She didn't.  In a March 24 piece, after giving the Post's readers a crash course in using a computer "reset" button, Applebaum accused the Obama administration in living "in a virtual reality" -- at least, as far as its relations with Moscow are concerned.  Rejecting the notion that deteriorating relations between the two countries were due to some "technical complications" (and who argues to the contrary?), Applebaum observed -- in a pretty much Krameresque  fashion -- that it's:

"[T]he profound differences in psychology, philosophy and policy that have been the central source of friction between the American and Russian governments for the past decade."

Following Applebaum's logic, it's only with countries that share the U.S.' "psychology, philosophy and policy" that the United States can have meaningful arms control negotiations.

On March 30, on the eve of the Obama-Medvedev meeting, the Post published another editorial.  Apparently being unsure of which part of the U.S.-Russia dialogue they were unhappy with on this particular day, the Post's editors simply called on Obama to be tough on Medvedev ("or...Russia's de facto top ruler, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin").  They also extended more practical advice: to stuff the conversation with Medvedev with "a range of issues", including Iran's nuclear program, NATO expansion, and Russia's having "a region of privileged interest."

But the next day, the Post surprisingly published an op-ed by President Medvedev.  Although carrying an olive-branch title "Building Russian-U.S. Bond", Medvedev's piece didn't cede any ground.  Medvedev made it very clear that in in its relations with the United States, Russia has only one short-term priority: a speedy resumption of the arms control talks.  Medvedev did offer a vague promise of cooperation on Afghanistan, but pointedly didn't even mention Iran. 

On April 1, three full-length articles were published covering the Obama-Medvedev summit in London: by Pan and Michael Shear (alone and with Mary Jordan).  

Capping the topic with the next day's editorial, the Post praised Obama for "not seeking to develop a personal relationship with the Russian leaders", but, rather, focusing on "concrete interests."  The editorial's conclusion is a gem:

"Mr. Obama is right to pragmatically pursue arms control agreements with Russia and to seek its cooperation on Iran and counterterrorism.  But he must also make clear to the Kremlin that collaboration in those areas will never mean consent for Russian autocracy or neo-imperialism, and that as long as those policies persist, the regime's fantasy of a global partnership with the United States will remain just that."

Sounds perfectly Krameresque, doesn't it?  Or should I say: Kafkaesque?

July Deliveries

One of the remarkable features of the first personal meeting between presidents Obama and Medvedev was that it didn't turn personal.  Mindful of the "looking-in-the-eye-sensing-the-soul" trap, both leaders were all business.  If by any chance their conversation was held in Russian, they would have definitely addressed each other "на вы", rather than "на ты."  During their brief joint appearance before the media, no "Baracks" or "Dmitrys" were exchanged.  Instead, Obama was calling Medvedev "president Medvedev" (four times), whereas Medvedev was calling Obama "president Obama" (three times) or "president of the United States" (twice). 

But the maturity of the two young presidents -- or savvy of their foreign policy advisers, for that matter -- extended well beyond the communication styles.  It was reflected, first and foremost, in their ability to address the most crucial, fateful, and time-sensitive aspect of U.S.-Russia relations: the renewal of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), expiring on December 5.  Obama and Medvedev instructed their respective negotiation teams to get started immediately and to deliver a progress report by July, apparently concurrently with Obama's planned visit to Moscow.

The sense of urgency surrounding the issue was highlighted by Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  Lugar pointed out that for the Senate to ratify a new treaty before December 5, it should be submitted to Congress by early fall, to allow for hearings, debate and a floor vote.  But, Lugar cautions, to clear the necessary bureaucratic processing, the treaty itself will have to be signed no later than early August.  This is what Lugar calls "the real deadline."

(Following Lugar's logic, it would appear that should the START negotiations proceed without delays, the real purpose of Obama's visit to Moscow (presumably in late July) will be signing of the new treaty.)

Reminding that it took nine months for the 2003 Moscow Treaty-- the last arms control agreement signed by Russia and the United States -- to proceed from submission to ratification, Lugar urges president Obama to stay focused and not get distracted:

President Obama must carefully set priorities and pick a limited set of U.S. goals in the negotiations. The primary goal should be to solidify the START verification regime and to maintain legally binding commitments on both sides in the Moscow Treaty. To lead is to choose, and the president and Secretary of State Clinton must resist calls to load the negotiations agenda with objectives that, while desirable, would slow down the talks and threaten the tight timetable.

Some outsiders have urged the administration to aim high by seeking to negotiate even lower strategic-nuclear-weapons levels, to devise a structure to address tactical nuclear weapons, establish a framework of cooperation—rather than confrontation—over missile defense, and break the current stalemate over reductions in conventional forces in Europe. These are worthy goals, but first things first: let’s renew the central arms-control agreement between our two countries. Then we’ll be in a better position to tackle these more complicated issues.

Lugar's warning of "some outsiders" is right on target.  There are enough people in Washington opposing the "reset" in U.S.-Russia relations.  Reluctant to attack the popular START treaty head-on, they prefer to sink the agreement by attaching heavy baggage to it, Iran's nuclear program being the most frequently used dumbbell.  Already, the Washington Post's Jackson Diehl argues:

" As U.S. officials readily acknowledge, strategic arms control is of much greater interest to Russia -- whose nuclear arsenal is rapidly deteriorating -- than it is to the United States. From Washington's perspective, stopping Iran's nuclear program is far more urgent than agreeing on the next incremental reduction in Cold War warheads. Yet Obama essentially consented in his first summit with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to devote the next four months of U.S.-Russian relations to an intensive effort to complete a new START treaty. No such cooperation on Iran is on the horizon." 

In a castle of chimeras Diehl inhabits, non-existing Iranian missiles represent much larger threat to the American national security than thousands of real nuclear warheads in Russia!

Yet Diehl has a point by saying that the Russians are highly motivated to strike the START deal.  There are no major disagreements, among Russia's political elites, on the issue, and the conveniently compliant Duma will ratify, in a heartbeat, everything Medvedev will decide to sign.  

The U.S. Senate -- stuffed with supersized egos and subject to diverse anti-Russian influence -- is a completely different animal.  The question with respect to START therefore is (using the Post's vocabulary): will Obama be able "to deliver"?     

e2-e4

A few weeks ago, I suggested that Russian president Dmitry Medvedev should firmly "insert" himself into the cockpit of the jet of U.S.-Russia relations by presenting his in-depth views on all major aspects of the relationship.

He did.  But instead of giving an extended interview to a top U.S. media source, as I recommended, he's opted for an op-ed.  Pointedly, he's chosen The Washington Post, an outlet that is trying relentlessly to torpedo the emerging Washington-Moscow dialogue.    

I have an impression that Medvedev struggled to fill even this small space that the format of an op-ed offered to him, for, I believe, he needed only the first four paragraphs of his 800-word piece to articulate his position on the eve of his meeting with President Obama in London tomorrow. 

First, Medvedev has put blame for the soured U.S.-Russia relations squarely on the shoulders of the "previous" American administration, referring specifically to its plans to deploy a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, eastward NATO expansion, and refusal to ratify the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.   

Second, he confirmed that he considers the "U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration" -- a document signed by then-Presidents Bush and Putin in Sochi, in April 2008 -- a "road map" to "pragmatic and businesslike" cooperation between the two countries.  This is an important point, as it emphasizes Russia's commitment to relations that honor prior agreements and aren't subject to lengthy "reviews" by every incoming American administration. 

Third, Medvedev "agree[d] with President Obama that resuming the disarmament process should become our immediate priority."

The rest of Medvedev's piece is filled with polite words about the "special responsibility" the United States and Russia have in world affairs; about a few glorious moments in the history of U.S.-Russia relations; and about "a great future for out two nations" predicted, long ago, by Alexis de Tocqueville.  A vague promise of cooperation on Afghanistan was offered.  Iran wasn't  mentioned at all.

I'd make two major conclusions from Medvedev's piece.  First, Russia is coming to the negotiation table not as a suitor with extended hand or a junior partner.  Rather, it will demand complete parity in the relations and full respect for what it considers its vital national interests.  Second, Russia has only one short-term priority in its relations with the United States: a speedy resumption of the arms control talks.  The rest can wait, and if Washington wants more, Moscow will be willing to negotiate one topic at a time -- a la carte, so to speak.

Russia's position reminds me of the e2-e4 move, arguably, the most popular beginning in the game of chess.  Responses to this move are multiple, and each can lead to a completely different game.

Has President Obama played chess recently?

Midlife Crises

Sometime ago, I promised to myself not to write about Russia's "democratic opposition."  There are so many real things in the world.  Why waste time on political egomaniacs whose major declared goal is to "dismantle the illegitimate Putin-Medvedev regime"? 

But the news that Boris Nemtsov is going to run for mayor of Sochi, the host city of the 2014 Winter Olympics, has changed my mind.

Nemtsov was nominated by Solidarity, a three-month-old salad bowl of about a dozen of human rights and "liberal democratic" boutiques.  Nemtsov co-chairs Solidarity with Garry Kasparov, the architect of a new strategy of fighting  "the illegitimate Putin-Medvedev regime":  by subway-hopping around Moscow (giving a new meaning to the term "underground movement") followed by a theatrical surrender to yawning police at a pre-determined point on the surface.   Naturally, in front of foreign reporters' cameras. 

Pointedly excluded from the leadership of Solidarity was Kasparov's best buddy, Eduard Limonov, the leader of the banned neo-fascist National Bolshevik Party.  I suspect that as a proponent of violent clashes with the authorities, Limonov hasn't passed the muster of being a "liberal democrat."    

Nemtsov was born in Sochi and now claims that he decided to run after receiving a petition from 400 Sochi residents urging him to do so.  (Hmm, OK).  It's still uncertain whether he'll be allowed to register as a candidate and even less certain whether he has any chance to win.  Two more prominent carpetbaggers have descended upon the city: Andrei Lugovoi, whose murky association with the 2006 death, in London, of Alexander Litvinenko, has propelled him to the stardom of national politics; and banker Alexander Lebedev, who never misses a chance to remind Russia's political beaumonde that he's still around. 

And then, there is acting Sochi mayor, Anatoly Pakhomov -- a protege of the powerful Krasnodar Territory governor, Alexander Tkachev -- who can count on the well-oiled election campaign machine owned by United Russia.

Given the circumstances, it's tempting to conclude that the whole story about Nemtsov's nomination is no more than a PR stunt orchestrated by him and his Solidarity friends.  Denied registration or losing the vote, Nemtsov will get an opportunity to complain, for at least the next few years, about the lack of "free elections" in Russia -- a song he's been singing since 2003, when his party, The Union of Right Forces(SPS), miserably lost the Duma election.   

And yet, somehow I believe that Nemtsov is serious in his intention to run.  Moreover, for some reason, I feel that he wants to win badly.  Even more -- and I realize that here, I'm speaking heresy -- I suspect that he may turn out to be a quite decent mayor of Sochi.

Nemtsov used to be a real practicing politician: first, as a successful governor of Nizhny Novgorod and then, as first deputy prime minister.  Even with his image tarnished by his chaotic personal life, Nemtsov's political stock had been rising to the extent that he was seriously considered, in 1997, as then-president Yeltsin's successor.

Nemtsov's career was derailed by the August 1998 financial crisis, and he was forced to resign from government.  Later, Yeltsin had chosen Vladimir Putin as the next president of Russia.  (So when Nemtsov calls Putin's regime "illegitimate," I can see his point.)  Nemtsov had spent the next 10 years attempting to elevate his personal animosity for Putin into the rank of an "opposition" ideology.     

Nemtsov, who is 49, is apparently going through what many men in this country call a "midlife crisis."  A clever fellow as he is, he understands that he has a choice: to remain a political jerk for the rest of his life or to break away from senseless "protests" and to try do something meaningful for himself, his children, and the Russian people he's been neglecting for so long.

Undoubtedly, the example of Nemtsov's former SPS friend, Nikita Belykh, who recently became governor of the Kirov District, has had an impact on Nemtsov, too.

So, I have a dream.  I have a dream that Nemtsov becomes mayor of Sochi and makes the 2014 Winter Olympics a blast -- while transforming Sochi into the least corrupt city in the country. 

I also have a dream that Kasparov, 45, will attend the next tournament in Linares and kick the shit out of youngsters who are unfamiliar with what genuine, competitive, chess is.

And Limonov, 66, will open his laptop and type in:

It's Me, Eddie.  Thirty Years After.