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Eugene Ivanov

The Mismatch

The ongoing parliamentary election campaign in Russia reminds me of an electric fireplace. Everything seems to be there: firewood, flames, and heat. But there is no fire. Likewise, the Duma campaign – now in its final stretch – has all the attributes of a real political happening. The streets of Russian cities are decorated with election paraphernalia. TV and radio debates are in full swing -- and, in contrast to previous campaigns, even the United Russia party is participating. Complaints of election law violations – the perennial feature of every Russian election – keep mounting. But there is no fire.

The announcement that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is returning to the presidency next spring has deprived the current electoral cycle of its major intrigue and has brought a sense of finality in the mindset of the country’s elites. An unintended – however, hardly unanticipated – result of this development has been a precipitous drop in public interest in the next composition of the State Duma, a government body that many Russians consider a rubberstamp to the all-powerful executive. (A recent Vedomosti editorial called the Duma a “Ministry of Approvals.”)

Interestingly, this lack of enthusiasm peacefully coexists with a growing sense that the election results may not be “as usual.” The long-predicted decline in public support for the ruling United Russia party is finally taking place, and even the top party officials have grudgingly accepted the fact that United Russia is not likely to repeat its 2007 success – a constitutional majority in the Duma.

Given United Russia’s obvious vulnerability, one would expect that its major opponents – the communists (KPRF) and the liberal democrats (LDPR) – will intensify their attacks on their bleeding rival. This hasn’t happened. It would appear that both KPRF and LDPR are intentionally conducting low-key election campaigns, giving United Russia a chance to lose a “referendum” with the Russian voters. Messrs. Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky believe – and not without reason – that any United Russia loss will be their win in terms of additional Duma seats.

True, United Russia still possesses enough of the notorious “administrative resource” to buttress its election numbers. The problem is that this may backfire. A recent report by the Center of Strategic Development has concluded that should United Russia receive 60-70 percent of the vote – a target that many believe the Kremlin has set for the party – the majority of Russians will consider the result as evidence of election fraud, not of the party’s high popularity with voters. The report goes as far as to claim that no more than 25-30 percent of the vote collected by United Russia will be accepted by the voters as a legitimate outcome.

This clear lack of trust in the legitimacy of the election process seems to be only part of a general trend: a growing sense of alienation of ordinary citizens from the country’s powers-that-be. A Levada Center poll released on Nov. 17 indicates that 68 percent of Russians (a 6 percent increase since 2007) believe that the “authorities” pursue interests that are different from those of the society at large. 85 percent of the respondents (an 8 percent increase since 2008) think that the majority of government officials systematically violate state laws. The same percentage of responders is also convinced that when engaged in political activities, Russian politicians follow only their personal financial interests.

However troubling the Levada findings might be, they do provide a glimpse of hope for the future of Russia’s democratic institutions. For example, although a whopping 82 percent of Russians believe that they can’t influence political processes in the country, 14 percent feel they can – a 6 percent increase since 2008. A third of responders also say that they are ready to participate in political actions, even if at the local level. However timid, these indications of the growing maturity of the Russian civil society seem to reflect the emergence of the middle class willing to take more responsibility for the situation in the country.

And this may pose serious systemic risks for the Kremlin. Public polls not only show the declining popularity of the current leaders; they reveal growing demand for a rotation in the upper echelons of power, a demand that the current “power vertical” – totally averse to real political competition – is unable to match. Besides, a recent study conducted by sociologists at the Moscow State University points to rapidly diminishing public appeal for “stability” so characteristic for the past ten years. The study suggests that as the first post-Soviet generation of young educated entrepreneurs comes of age, the prevailing sentiment is shifting from “stability” to “active development” mode.

By promising 12 years of more “stability,” Putin might be offering his compatriots a product that is not already in high demand. Like an electric fireplace in the middle of a hot summer.

Are We Trying To Lose Russia Again?

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

Russia is back in the focus of U.S. media. Needless to say, the coverage is mostly negative: as I wrote before, only “bad” news about Russia can spark excitement in American media circles.

The burst of interest in all things Russian was triggered by the recent announcement that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was returning to the Kremlin next spring. An op-ed in Los Angeles Times -- under the screaming headline “Watch out for Putin” -- promptly suggested that Russia was headed “for a dead end.” Sensing the opportune moment, Kathy Lally of The Washington Post dutifully manufactured a new episode for the endless series “Russia clamps down on opposition.” She followed up with a piece describing how Russian politicians are using “dirty tricks” ahead of the State Duma elections – apparently on the assumption that this practice is unique for Russia.

Then, in a brilliant display of black humor, on Halloween, the FBI released videos related to the “Operation Ghost Stories.” Remember the counterintelligence masterpiece that resulted in busting the alleged Russian “spy ring” last summer? Unfortunately, when compared to the high-definition TV horror stuff one could watch on Halloween, the FBI production looks particularly bleak. Most of the videos are filled with colorless, ghost-looking silhouettes endlessly traveling long underpasses and tirelessly exchanging brown-paper shopping bags. As if suspecting that the public would have hard time to remember what the “Operation Ghost Stories” was all about, the producer included one more piece of counterintelligence art, the one allegedly featuring the infamous Anna Chapman. In this video staged in a coffee shop in New York, Chapman -- who, due to the poor quality of the recording, doesn’t even look redheaded, save for red-hot -- meets with an “undercover agent.”

And just to remind us that Russian spying in the U.S. is alive and well – even with Ms. Chapman back in Moscow – the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive told Congress that Russia’s cyber-economic espionage represents a growing threat to U.S. national interests.

Not spooked yet? Then read about the latest report by the International Atomic Energy Agency claiming that foreign scientists had helped Iran develop technology necessary to build nuclear weapons. And who these “foreign scientists” were? Duh! The Post identified one Vyacheslav Danilenko, “a former Soviet nuclear scientist,” as the major culprit. (For the record: Mr. Danilenko strongly denied the accusation of being “farther of the Iranian nuclear bomb.”)

Given the circumstances, could American pundits and politicians stay away from the fray? You bet. Thus, on Oct. 25, The Heritage Foundation hosted a day-long event under the banner “The Risks of the Reset.” One could easily dismiss the Heritage happening as yet another anti-Russian “шабаш” if not for the fact that it was blessed with the appearance of Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives John Boehner (R-Ohio).

It’s quite remarkable that in the middle of contentious bi-partisan negotiations on spending cuts, Speaker Boehner could find time for attending a mundane expert gathering at a think tank. It’s also puzzling that he – as someone not known for interest in foreign policy issues, including U.S.-Russia relations -- would give a speech that stopped short of calling for a new Cold War on Russia. On the other hand, if castigating the Obama administration’s “reset” policy was indeed Boehner’s objective, his choice of The Heritage event was very appropriate: one of the Foundation’s own experts on Russia has recently called the “reset” a “Cold War restart.”

A trivial explanation of the criticism of the Obama administration’s Russia policy would be that with the 2012 presidential and congressional elections in mind, the Republicans are trying to deprive the president of one of his most obvious foreign policy successes. From this point of view, Boehner’s escapades against the “reset” could be viewed as simply a mandatory contribution to the election-campaign Obama bashing. Not surprisingly, Mitt Romney, the leading Republican presidential candidate, has, too, made the “reset” the primary target of his attacks at the administration foreign policy. In a recent interview, Romney insisted that “[the ‘reset’] has to end.”

But perhaps, Boehner’s speech at The Heritage served yet another purpose. The Speaker argued that the Obama administration should link its approval for Russia’s admission in the WTO to a border dispute between Russia and Georgia stemming from the 2008 military conflict between the two countries. Here is what he said precisely:

“The administration should resolve this stalemate in a manner that respects the territorial integrity of Georgia. Then – and only then – will movement on the WTO question be worth considering.”

This is a strange statement. Boehner was certainly aware at the time of his speech that the U.S. had already acquiesced to Russia’s WTO entry – and that such decisions are made by the president, not Congress, anyway. What is a congressional responsibility, though, is to graduate Russia from the notorious Jackson-Vanik amendment, a Cold War era anachronism depriving Russia of normal trade relations with the U.S. However, once Russia is in the WTO – and now, this looks imminent – the burden will be on Congress to repeal the amendment; otherwise, the lack of normal trade relation status with Russia will hurt U.S. companies. And here Boehner’s problem lies: he seems to be incapable of overcoming strong opposition in Congress – headed by the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Ileana Ros-Lehtinen -- to the amendment's repeal. By simultaneously attacking Russia and Obama’s “reset” policy, Boehner is creating an “ideological” basis to justify Congress’ unwillingness to defend vital U.S. economic interests.

So far, the Obama administration has refused to apologize for its Russia policy. During the recent meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Honolulu, Obama hailed the successes of the “reset.” Also, by creating a State Department secret list of Russian officials whose entry in the U.S. is banned, the administration has essentially neutralized the so-called Cardin bill, whose negative effects on U.S.-Russia relations, if adopted by the Senate, would be hard to underestimate. Yet, responding to the frequent criticism that the benefits of the “reset” came at a price of Russia’s deteriorating human rights situation, the White House has indicated that it’s shifting the focus of its Russia policy on human rights issues.

This latest twist is not without peril. Obama must know that nothing can poison the Washington-Moscow dialogue faster than his attempt to lecture the Russian president, whoever he is, on human rights. It’s the Republicans who, at the moment, have nothing to lose from “losing Russia.” In contrast, Obama needs Russia to advance America’s national interests. Especially, if he’ll succeed in becoming a two-term president.

The Ambassador Of Better Will

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

On Oct. 11, a day before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate was to begin hearings on the nomination of Michael McFaul, President Barack Obama’s top Russia adviser, as the next U.S. ambassador to Russia, the Washington Post published an op-ed by David Kramer, president of Freedom House, and Robert Kagan, of the Brookings Institute. In their piece, Kramer and Kagan called on the Senate to confirm McFau

Uh-oh! When two sworn enemies of the Obama administration’s policy of the “reset” voice their support for a man widely considered as one of its architects, something must be going on.

The intense media coverage of McFaul’s nomination, first announced by the White House in May, is somewhat unusual: after all, no one in Washington, DC was bubbling with excitement when John Beyrle, the current U.S. Ambassador to Russia, was sent to Moscow in 2008. And, honestly, how many American journalists know the name of the Russian Ambassador to the United States? For the record, it’s Sergey Kislyak.

Besides, the reasons for replacing Beyrle, a career diplomat, with diplomatic novice McFaul have never been clearly articulated, although it's true that during his tenue, Beyrle commited a couple of faux pas. In August 2008, shortly after the beginning of military activities in South Ossetia, Beyrle irritated his superiors at the State Department by claiming that Russia’s response to the attack by the Georgian military on Russian peacekeepers was justified; he later backtracked from this statement. This “error of judgment,” however, didn’t cost Beyrle, a George W. Bush appointee, his job. Impressed with Beyrle’s credentials, the newly elected President Obama asked him to stay in Moscow. In December 2010, Beyrle was in hot waters again: classified diplomatic cables posted by WikiLeaks revealed some unflattering opinions he had about the Medvedev-Putin tandem. Obviously offended, Moscow nevertheless made it clear that it was ready to leave the WikiLeaks story behind. Neither incident, however, had prevented Beyrle from taking part in all important bilateral meetings over the past four years, including presidential summits.

Some Russian analysts, pointing to McFaul’s experience in security issues, took his nomination as a sign that Washington is going to pay more attention to U.S.-Russia relations – exactly at a time when these relations are particularly troubled by seemingly irreconcilable differences over European missile defense. Others are not so sure: they argue that if Obama needed McFaul for help in defining Russia policy, he would have kept McFaul in the White House in Washington rather than in Spaso House in Moscow where McFaul will be inevitably overwhelmed with numerous administrative chores.

The second point of view does seem to hit the nerve: should the Obama administration pursue the policy of the “reset” in its current form, why would there be any need to replace Beyrle with McFaul -- or anyone else, for that matter? Instead, it appears that by dispatching McFaul to Moscow, the White House is sending a message that its policy toward Russia is about to change.

The shift in U.S. policy toward Russia seems to grow from purely domestic roots. Preparing for a tough re-election campaign next year – and weathering a tsunami of criticism for his economic policies – President Obama has chosen the path many of his predecessors have traveled: he has begun promoting his national security and foreign policy successes. The policy of the “reset” with Russia is one of the administration’s most obvious achievements in the international area: Obama can point to a new arms control agreement and also to increased cooperation with Russia on Afghanistan and Iran. Yet, critics of the “reset,” such as Kramer and Kagan, keep arguing that its benefits came at a price: willful ignorance of what they call “Russia’s deteriorating human rights situation.” To deflect this criticism, the Obama administration has apparently decided to shift the focus of its Russia policy on human rights issues.

HereMcFaul's credentials of an academic with a strong track record of "democracy promotion" come in handy. So does his scathing criticism of then-President Vladimir Putin's policies in 2000-2008. And the title of McFaul's latest book -- "Advancing democracy abroad: why we should and how wew can" -- must have had the same effect on Kramer and Kagan as the sound of a horn on a hunting horse.

Evidently, the White House decided not to wait until McFaul’s confirmation by the Senate to introduce the new “twist” in its policy vis-à-vis Moscow. A couple of weeks ago, Michael Posner, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, went to Russia on a six-day trip. While traveling in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan and meeting with Russia’s civil activists, Posner played the role of a Goodwill Ambassador of sorts, delivering a preachy message that ”the United States would 'redouble' its efforts to make sure Russia heeded international norms on human rights.” If Posner’s “goodwill” mission is an example of what the White House expects of the next U.S. Ambassador to Russia, then there is no doubt that McFaul – who, unlike Posner, lived in Russia and speaks fluent Russian – will be even better Goodwill Ambassador than Posner. Whet will happen to the "reset" McFaul reportedly helped to architect, remains to be seen.

The No-Apology Candidate

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

In the summer/fall of 2007, Foreign Affairs, an American magazine specializing in international relations and U.S. foreign policy, offered its pages to candidates for the 2008 U.S. presidential elections. In the July/August issue of the magazine, Mitt Romney, introduced as “Governor of Massachusetts from 2003 to 2007 [and] a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination,” took this offer to outline his foreign policy views. Incidentally, neighboring Romney in the printed space was Barack Obama, “a Democratic Senator from Illinois and a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.”

Back in 2007, Romney was promoting himself as the only serious Republican candidate with a successful corporate career. This was reflected in the way Romney presented his foreign policy bona fides: his Foreign Affairs piece read as a business plan -- a list of steps a Romney administration would take to confront the challenges facing the nation. While strongly advocating increased spending on national defense (he actually used the term “investment”), Romney, for example, promised to reduce the waste of defense dollars by hiring “a team of private-sector leaders and defense experts” to scrutinize military purchasing. Of course, Romney had done his homework. He professed unconditional love for Israel, and his list of challenges to America's interests around the world included all usual suspects: Iran, Hugo Chavez, and "the economic rise of China." Interestingly, in a long, almost 5,000-word, piece, Romney mentioned Russia only once – in a quite benign context of U.S. energy independence: “…we [should] end our strategic vulnerability to oil shutoffs by nations such as Iran, Russia, and Venezuela.”

Fast forward to Fall 2011. Romney is running for president again, but this time he’s no longer just “a candidate” for the Republican presidential nomination -- he is a presumed frontrunner. As such, Romney prefers not to argue with fellow presidential hopefuls; rather, he brings the fight directly to President Obama’s doorstep. So when time came to challenge Obama’s foreign policy, the venue was not an article in an “academic” magazine; it was a speech at the Citadel, a military college in Charleston, S.C. The date of the speech – Oct. 7, the 10^th anniversary of sending U.S. troops to Afghanistan – doesn’t appear coincidental, either.

Calling for a new “American Century” and promising to “never, ever apologize for America” – which, as Romney asserts, President Obama does all the time -- Romney blasts “the feckless policies of the past three years.” He blames the current president for the loss of American leadership in the world and the lack of “clarity of American purpose and resolve,” which, in Romney’s opinion, made the globe “a far more dangerous place.”

The topic of Russia came rather early in the Citadel speech. Describing to the prospective U.S. military leaders the uncertain world America will be facing in the near future, Romney preaches:

“Russia is at a historic crossroads. Vladimir Putin has called the breakup of the Soviet empire the great tragedy of the 20^th Century. Will he try to reverse that tragedy and bludgeon the countries of the former Soviet Union to submission, and intimidate Europe with the levels of its energy resources?”

The question that Romney is posing is no more than oratorical trick, for just a few minutes later, he explicitly identifies “a resurgent Russia, led by a man who believes the Soviet Union was great, not evil” as one of “powerful forces that may threaten freedom, prosperity, and America’s national interests.” No less. Incidentally, the origin of this bold Soviet Union claim isn’t all too obvious, so if President Putin has a chance to meet in the future with President Romney, he may ask for a direct quote.

Having delivered the Citadel speech, Romney wasn’t done with Russia just yet. The same day, he gave an interview to the Washington Post’s Russophobe-in-residence, Jennifer Rubin. In the interview, Romney spoke of Putin’s plans “of rebuilding Russian empire” using, as Romney sees it, “annexing populations as they did in Georgia.” (This sounds awkward: usually, it’s territories that are annexed, not populations.) And when asked by the ever-helpful Rubin what he would do with the “reset,” Romney didn’t mince words: “It has to end.”

It would be too premature, however, to conclude that Romney’s current position vis-à-vis Russia, hostile as it may appear, will necessarily translate into explicit anti-Russian policies of his prospective presidency. Romney’s self-proclaimed status of the major Republican opponent to President Obama forces him to use every opportunity to criticize the Obama administration. While criticizing the White House’s economic policies is easy, given the status of U.S. economy, it’s much trickier to challenge Obama’s foreign policy. The fact is that in many respects, the Obama administration’s current foreign policy discourse isn’t much different from that of his predecessor. And this poses a problem for Romney because his new “American Century” proposal is a slightly disguised version of the George W. Bush administration's “us-vs.-them” approach.

Obama’s policy of the “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations is perhaps the only area where Romney can see a clear deviation from the policies of the Bush era. Romney therefore attacks the “reset” because there is not much else to attack.

It remains to be seen whether the newly-acquired aggressive streak in Romney’s foreign policy views will eventually prevail, or if he will instead gradually return to more pragmatic approach he adhered to in 2007. It remains to be seen, too, which effect Romney’s choice of Leon Aron -- a prominent Russia expert from the American Enterprise Institute -- as his Russia advisor will have on his presidential campaign.

It may well happen that at certain point of his presidency, should it materialize, Romney will realize that having Russia as a partner serves American national interests better than having it as a foe. And who knows: Romney may decide to meet with Putin and look into his soul? And make no apology for that.

Resetting Putin

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

A consensus is emerging among Russia watchers that Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency will have little impact on the country’s foreign policy and, in particular, on U.S.-Russia relations. Andrew Kuchins, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., has eloquently summarized this sentiment:

“The possible election of Putin as the President of Russia will not signify a fundamental change in the direction of U.S.-Russia relations. The main reason for this is the fact that no major decisions on foreign or domestic policy during the period of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency have been made without implicit or explicit support from Mr. Putin.”

In other words, Medvedev’s foreign policy decisions were always those of the tandem, and the tandem’s decisions were always those of Putin. Or, paraphrasing the Russian poet Vladimir Mayakovski: when we say Medvedev, we mean the Tandem, and when we say the Tandem, we mean Putin.

Not everyone is subscribing to this relaxing opinion. For example, the American Enterprise Institute’s Leon Aron, in an article titled “Watch out for Putin, and Russia,” points to what he calls Putin’s “profound mistrust of the West” and warns that “the United States must prepare for…destabilizing developments.” Aron predicts that no progress will be made on European missile defense and expects that Russia will be less cooperative on Iran.

And, naturally, there are always folks trying to find a common ground between optimists and pessimists. Thus, the Washington Post’s Mary Beth Sheridan attempted to sound neutral:

“Now, [U.S. President] Obama is going to have to get used to a new partner – Vladimir Putin.”

Is he really? Remember, if Putin is elected, he will be sworn as the next president of Russia in May 2012. At this time, President Obama will be in the middle of a tough re-election campaign; the last thing on his to-do list will be improving a frosty relationship with his newly inaugurated Russian “partner.” Not to mention the fact that any attempt to cozy up with Putin will be immediately interpreted by Obama’s Republican opponents as Putin “appeasement.”

Obama and Putin met once, in July 2009, during Obama’s visit to Russia, and this was a tough one-on-one, according to the people present. Obama can’t blame anyone but himself: shortly before the meeting, he described Putin as having “one foot in the old ways of doing business and one foot in the new.” This comment was apparently intended to signal the administration’s support for President Medvedev’s modernization agenda. In hindsight, however, it is clear that Obama’s whole approach – and, in particular, his jab at Putin -- was misguided.

It appears unlikely that this mistake can be corrected quickly. True, Obama and Putin will have opportunities to meet face-to-face in 2012: once at the G8/NATO summit in Chicago in May and then at the APEC meeting in Vladivostok, Russia in November. It’s, however, highly doubtful that these bilateral mini-summits will produce anything more substantial than mandatory photo-ops.

And then, in November, the presidential election in the U.S. will take place. Obama has about a 50-50 chance of losing it, and should this happen, the agenda and the dynamics of the Washington-Moscow dialogue for the foreseeable future will be defined not by Putin, but by the next U.S. president, a Republican. Incidentally, Mitt Romney, currently the leading Republican presidential candidate -- and, therefore, the likeliest “new partner” for Putin – remarked recently that the “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations “has to end.”

Of course, Obama may still get re-elected, but his ability to conduct Russia policy he wants will be further limited by the expected loss of the Democratic majority in the Senate, something that the apologists of the “nothing-is-going-to change” approach seem to overlook. It is not a secret that Obama invested heavily in his relationship with Medvedev -- on the assumption that supporting Medvedev was a way to signal U.S. support for reforms in Russia and, of course, on the assumption that supporting Medvedev will improve his chances to be elected for the second term. Now, having been proven wrong, Obama will feel utterly uncomfortable in his communications with Putin. Making things even worse, Senate Republicans – most likely, in majority -- will obstruct his every move vis-à-vis Russia, however benign.

In 2008, Henry Kissinger perceptively observed that when Putin was president, “Russian policy … [was] … driven in a quest for a reliable strategic partner, with America being the preferred choice.” Regardless of whether Putin “trusts” or “mistrusts” the West, he has all the reasons to believe that his offer of strategic partnership to the United States had been rejected by anti-Russian policies of the Bush administration. What has Putin heard so far from the other side of the Atlantic that persuaded him that the U.S. now considers him a “new partner?” That he is not supposed to change Russia’s U.S. policy?

Naturally, any speculations on the direction of Russian foreign policy during Putin’s third and, possibly, fourth presidential term are premature, yet, the very notion that nothing will change because Medvedev’s past initiatives were implicitly or explicitly supported by Putin – and who knows that for sure? – appears as dangerously naïve. After all, Putin’s acquiescing to Medvedev’s decisions – or choosing not to veto some of them – doesn’t prove his endorsement of these decisions, much less a willingness to pursue them. If American presidents regularly throw away foreign policy initiatives of their predecessors, why should Putin not feel free to do the same?

The Next Stop Is Duma

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

Will those who believe that the Dec. 4 Duma elections still matter please raise their hands? Well, not a big crowd. And no wonder: the announcement that Vladimir Putin is returning to the presidency next spring has consumed all the attention of the pundits and the general public. By resolving what has long been considered as the major intrigue of the upcoming electoral cycle, the announcement has brought a sense of finality to the discussion of the future power configuration in the Kremlin. With Putin and Medvedev preordained to become Russia’s next co-chiefs of the all-powerful executive branch, who’d care about the composition of an inferior legislative body whose only function, according to a widespread belief, is to stamp executive orders, a body which its own speaker defined as not a “place for political discussions?”

And yet, the Duma matters – and so does its election. The lower house of parliament traditionally plays an important role in drafting the state budget; in addition, it provides a convenient platform for the regions to plead their cases before federal government. This attracts to the Duma numerous lobbyists representing Russia’s special interests. Every region or large city along with every major corporation considers it a must to have their representatives in the Duma. Besides, a position of a Duma deputy carries with it some prestige -- as well as parliamentary immunity, so many wealthy businesspeople seek Duma membership to elevate their public profile and to protect themselves from criminal prosecution. Parliamentarians actually fight for the opportunity to be elected in the next Duma, with the party allegiances often becoming a victim in these fights. Thus, having learned that he was excluded from the United Russia party’s electoral list for the upcoming election, high-ranked “edinoross” Sergei Shishkarev offered his legislative skills to the Communist Party. After careful consideration, the Communists turned down this generous offer.

Experts predict that the composition of the next Duma will follow a “3+2” formula. That means that only three political parties will overcome the 7% electoral threshold and form full-fledged Duma factions. In addition, two more parties will collect between 5% and 7% of the vote and, in accordance with a recent change to the electoral law, be allowed to occupy one or two Duma seats.

The Holy Trinity of the parties whose presence in the Duma is all but guaranteed is composed of United Russia, the Communist Party (KPRF) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR). Understanding that their place in the Duma is assured – and being aware that they will not be allowed to have Duma factions whose size would threaten the domination of United Russia – KPRF and LDPR chose to conduct low-key election campaigns. The electoral programs composed by both parties represent a conventional blend of demands of lavish social spending with a mild criticism of United Russia -- but not Putin personally. Neither program includes any bold or even original propositions, unless you count as one KPRF’s promise to create a “new union of fraternal nations” or LDPR’s desire to ban porn on the Internet. Looking forward to the election, KPRF is counting on the perennial loyalty of its core electorate and a solid network of regional party organizations, whereas LDPR, as usual, will benefit from entertaining TV appearances of its leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who, as all analysts agree, is in “excellent shape.”

Having expelled, in an intra-party putsch, its leader and the primary sponsor Mikhail Prokhorov, the Right Cause party has lost any chance of getting into the Duma. Yet, the party might still have a dog in the fight: the new leadership may hope that the removal of Prokhorov from active politics will be rewarded by their handlers in the presidential administration. The price would be the 3% of the vote, making the Right Cause eligible for the state financing for the next five years. It is unclear at this point, however, to which extent Andrei Dunayev & Co. are interested in running the election campaign at all; they seem to be more preoccupied with finding legal ways to keep the 800 million rubles (~$25-28 million) that Prokhorov contributed to the party coffers.

The election will be especially difficult for the Just Russia party. Following the departure of its leader Sergei Mironov from the helm of the Federation Council, Just Russia lost the administrative resource available to it in the past; defections of high-ranked party members and financial sponsors have further weakened the party. At certain point, it appeared that Just Russia was moving into opposition to the Kremlin. This hasn’t happened, though: the harsh criticism of United Russia was toned down, and plans to include a number of prominent opposition figures into Just Russia’s election list were scrapped. Apparently, the “Prokhorov affair” has taught everyone, including Mironov, a valuable lesson: fighting with the presidential administration will only make things worse. It is highly unlikely that Just Russia will be able to preserve its status of a bona fide Duma party. However, winning one or two Duma seats – one for Mironov and the other for his top lieutenant Nikolai Levichev -- is well within the party’s reach.

The unexpected winner of the upcoming election may turn out to be the moribund Yabloko party. As loud whispers of the Moscow rumor mill have it, the presidential administration didn’t completely abandon its idea of having a liberal party in the next Duma. But now, having terminated the “Prokhorov project,” the Kremlin turned its eye on Yabloko and decided to appoint its leader, well respected economist Grigoriy Yavlinsky, designated Duma liberal. Yabloko may therefore join Just Russia in becoming the second “mini-party” in the Duma, according to the “3+2” formula.

The biggest remaining unknown is whether United Russia will be able to win the constitutional majority in the 6th Duma. In the past, reaching this position was aided by two main factors: Putin’s personal popularity and United Russia’s formidable election campaign machine. This year, two additional “aces” were thrown in: the All-Russia Popular Front and Medvedev's leading United Russia’s electoral list. How the two will play out, isn’t completely clear: the buzz surrounding the creation of the Popular Front has so far failed to increase United Russia’s falling ratings, and at least for now, Medvedev’s name replacing Putin’s on the ballot is only confusing campaign managers.

Recent developments present a challenge for Medvedev himself. One the one hand, as president, he promised to ensure clean and honest election. On the other, his very future in politics now depends on the result that United Russia achieves in December. How this obvious conflict of interests between Medvedev the lame-duck president and Medvedev the aspiring party leader will be reconciled remains to be seen.

The Kremlin Castling

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

The moment of Decision 2012 has finally arrived. Last Saturday, addressing the cast of a costly show called the XII Congress of the United Russia party, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that he was not going to run for re-election. Instead, Medvedev proposed that United Russia nominated its leader and the current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as a candidate for the next year’s presidential election, something that would ensure Putin’s return to the Kremlin. Returning the favor, Putin promised to make Medvedev the head of his next cabinet should United Russia win the upcoming December Duma elections, as widely expected.

Some analysts in Russia, where the game of chess is a popular pastime, dubbed the announced arrangement “castling.” Those really familiar with the game would hardly agree: castling involves two chess pieces, the king and a rook, simply exchanging their positions on the chessboard. In contrast, the proposed leadership “swap” will fundamentally shift the balance of power in the Kremlin: in chess terms, it will bestow on Putin the importance of the king combined with the power of the queen, whereas Medvedev’s role will be reduced to that of the bishop, a piece that is often sacrificed for tactical reasons.

It is possible to argue that Putin’s return to the presidency would resolve the most important controversy in Russian politics. Putin is, and has been for years, the most popular Russian politician, as evidenced by multiple polls. In 2000-2008, his popularity matched his position as president, the highest state position according to the Constitution. However, in 2008, this “harmony” was distorted as Putin moved to the post of prime minister, formally subordinate to the president. The “tandem” between Putin and Medvedev was created to manage this distortion, with some original hopes expressed that the new structure would introduce a modicum of competition between two executive offices, the presidential administration and the Cabinet. But the arrangement proved to be too confusing for Russian elites. So, no matter what Putin’s critics will say – and, to be sure, there is going to be a tsunami of condemnations of his “authoritarian instincts,” both within Russia and abroad – Putin is returning to the position commensurate with his real status as a “leader of the nation,” a position that he would have easily won in any free and fair election.

Medvedev’s proposal to nominate Putin as United Russia’s presidential candidate was greeted with a standing ovation by the congress delegates, to which Medvedev observed that their reaction gave him the right to provide no further justification of Putin’s nomination. As far as Putin is concerned, Medvedev is right; but he is wrong if he believes that he owes no explanation about himself. Medvedev has just earned a dubious honor of becoming the first single-term president of Russia. And it begs the obvious question of: why? Medvedev showed strength and resolve during the August 2008 war in South Ossetia; he successfully navigated Russia through the stormy waters of the world economic crisis; he initiated a reform, however timid, of Russia’s broken judicial system; he improved the country’s image abroad; finally, he sharpened public consciousness with his modernization rhetoric. By all accounts, Medvedev’s first term in office was not a failure. Doesn’t Medvedev feel that he must explain – to his supporters, to the elites, to Russian voters -- why he chose not to seek re-election and why, in his opinion, Putin will be better as the next Russian president?

Actually, Medvedev did provide an explanation of sorts. He told the delegates that the Decision 2012 was actually made a few years ago, at the time when Medvedev and Putin were forming their tandem (a “comrade union,” as Medvedev put it), and he was therefore just delivering on what was agreed upon between the two back then.

There is a problem with this explanation. Over the past couple of years, when asked about his plans, Medvedev has repeatedly expressed his interest in the second term and kept saying that the final decision would be made based on the situation in the country and the results of his own work. With the decision made in fact back in 2007, has Medvedev been not deliberately deceiving his compatriots?

And here is another problem. Russia is a democracy, however imperfect, a country where political decisions are supposed to follow public discussions and consultations among the elites. Isn’t Medvedev afraid that a two-people “tandem” might be too narrow a base to make such decisions? Does he really believe that the democratic institutions in Russia can be strengthened by the introduction of such an unconstitutional entity as “comrade union?”

In recent months, there has been a pressure on Medvedev to announce his re-election bid and to use the time before the March presidential election to mobilize the electorate around his modernization agenda. Medvedev’s Saturday announcement not only shattered high hopes that some in Russia have had for him -- it has essentially transformed Medvedev into a lame-duck president a good half-year before the official end of his term. While Russians are readying to watch the Putin gambit, Medvedev’s game is precipitously turning into unwinnable endspiel.

Knocked Off The Right Cause

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

There is almost nothing money can’t buy in today’s Russia. The abundance of material goods – ordinary and luxurious, domestic and imported – is a given. And when it comes to things spiritual, people of means can always buy their way into politics. The wealthiest can even purchase a political party and play an exciting game of "Duma elections." What money can’t buy, however, is the ability to establish the rules by which the game of Russian politics is played. This function rests exclusively with the Kremlin.

Billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov learned this lesson the hard way. Last week, the congress of the Right Cause party, which Prokhorov has led for the past three months, rebelled and stripped him of the leadership position. Faced with the mutiny, Prokhorov chose not to fight; instead, he quit the party and promised to his supporters to start a new one. In a completely unprecedented move, Prokhorov publicly accused the deputy chief of the presidential administration, Vladislav Surkov, in inspiring and orchestrating the intraparty putsch. Prokhorov called Surkov “the puppet master” of Russian politics and vowed to force his resignation.

The Kremlin’s selection of Prokhorov to lead the moribund Right Cause party back in May was driven by a desire to have a “liberal” party in the next Duma, which will be formed after the elections scheduled for Dec. 4. Prokhorov’s candidacy as party leader looked attractive for two reasons. First, he had a raw charisma and undeniable media appeal. Second, and more importantly, being one of Russia's wealthiest men, Prokhorov was willing to assume the burden of the election campaign expenses, thus allowing the Kremlin to pursue its liberal-party-in-the-Duma project essentially for free. Naturally, certain agreements were made between the two parties. The Kremlin, having promised to Prokhorov a Duma seat at least for himself, wanted him to behave. For his part, Prokhorov, having promised not to explicitly criticize the tandem and the United Russia party, was apparently left with the impression that his wealth gave him more wiggle room than allowed to any other Russian politician.

Looking backwards, it’s now obvious that both sides miscalculated. The Kremlin didn’t anticipate how many mistakes the bold, energetic, but completely unschooled in political games Prokhorov could make in a short time. The Right Cause’s election platform, released in haste, was a joke; his claim at becoming the next prime minister of Russia (a position that, incidentally, is not vacant at the moment), while smacking good PR, went overboard; and his dictatorial leadership style – blatantly unfitting the supposedly “liberal” party he was trying to build – rapidly alienated the top party brass and the regional leaders, thus creating the fertile ground for the September coup d’état. For his part, Prokhorov’s biggest mistake was his inability to imagine just how little real decision making power he would enjoy as the leader of a political party, especially when compared to his prior life as a big corporate boss.

The formal reason for the clash between Prokhorov and Surkov was Prokhorov’s intent to include Yevgeny Roizman, the leader of “The City without Drugs” fund, on Right Cause’s candidate list for the upcoming Duma election. Following the presidential administration’s established policy to keep people with the criminal past from the Duma, Surkov demanded the removal of Roizman, a man with a prior criminal conviction. “Either him or you,” he reportedly told Prokhorov. Prokhorov refused, arguing that he couldn’t break public promise to Roizman. That sealed Prokhorov’s fate.

It’s hard to believe, though, that the “Roizman problem” couldn’t have been solved differently. For example, Surkov could have simply pressed the delegates of the party congress to vote down Roizman’s candidacy, something that even Prokhorov would have been unable to overrule. Surkov’s unwillingness to look for a compromise reflected the widely held opinion that President Dmitry Medvedev, initially very supportive of Prokhorov, have become disillusioned with him. Medvedev’s decision to terminate the “Prokhorov project” might have been part of a deal he struck with the leadership of United Russia, a deal that may pave way to his second presidential term.

It’s difficult to feel sorry for Prokhorov: he has enough pricy toys to keep him busy for the rest of his life. Yet, it’s deeply troubling that Russian voters holding liberal views will be unable – again -- to have a representation in the Duma.

A few years ago, the Speaker of the Duma Boris Gryzlov famously gaffed that the parliament was not “a place for discussion.” It still isn’t, given that the concentration of political power in the hands of the executive branch has reached extreme levels. The question that the “Prokhorov affair” brings to focus is: does Russia have a public place at all in which to discuss, in a constructive and civilized way, the problems facing the country?

And then there is another: if even money can’t buy you a way into politics, then what can?

Cassandra Who Cried Wolf, Or The Ungrateful Business Of Predicting Russia’s Future

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

In May 2001, the Atlantic magazine went to print featuring an article soberly titled “Russia is finished.”  Summarizing his experience in living in Russia since 1993, the article’s author, Jeffrey Tayler, predicted that “[g]iven the logic and propensities of Russian history, there appears to be no end in sight to the country’s decay.”  And also: “Putin’s plans to strengthen the state…, if carried out, would amount to a national death sentence.”

There appears to be something special about Russia: tireless Cassandras of all shapes and shades are endlessly churning up gloomy, sometimes almost apocalyptic, predictions about Russia’s future.  Often, the next forecast would blatantly contradict the previous, but their originators don’t seem to care.  Thus, a prominent expert in Russian economy predicted in January 2005 that “Putin will be out of office in the near future.”  Yet in the fall of 2007, the same expert opined that the Russian president will remain in power indefinitely by "possibly following declaration of a national military emergency."  Go figure.

Combing through the Russia media coverage in 2001, it becomes clear that predicting the country’s future was as popular then as it is today.  Looking back on the prognoses of that time with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, does it seem that the gleeful prognosticators of the day shared a crystal ball with the Prophet of Troy or had more in common with the proverbial boy who cried wolf?

In August 2001, Russia’s current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin – the most frequent target of all predictions – was in the 20^th month of his presidency; the current President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, served as deputy chief-of-staff of the Putin administration.  In 2001, Russia’s GDP reached $307 billion ($1.3 trillion projected for 2011) and hard-currency reserves stood at $35 billion (currently at $500 billion plus).  The BBC was about to launch the quiz show “The Weakest Link” on Russian TV, and the much despised United Russia party – can you believe this? – didn’t even exist. 

What was in the news?  At the beginning of the month, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il traveled across Russia in an armored train (sounds familiar, does it not?).  On Aug. 12, the country commemorated the first anniversary of the Kursk nuclear submarine tragic accident.  The 10^th anniversary of the failed 1991 coup dominated the media coverage in the second half of the month.  Also in the news were intense U.S.-Russian consultations: Washington was trying to persuade Moscow to acquiesce to U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.  The American side insisted, as it does today, that the United States needed a protection from missile attacks launched by the rogue states such as North Korea and Iraq (these days, Iran replaced Iraq).  In an Aug. 14 interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Alexei Arbatov (at thet time Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma) argued that the U.S. would only withdraw from the treaty when it started to actually deploy elements of a missile defense system, and this “will not happen for several years.”  Arbatov was wrong: the U.S. withdrew from the treaty in June 2002.

On Aug. 9, Russian prosecutors issued bribery charges against Ukrainian “opposition figure” Yulia Timoshenko who at the time already faced corruption charges back at home (sounds familiar, does it not?).  And in a bout of moral clarity, the New Your Times called (now jailed) oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky “…a man who…orchestrated a series of flagrant corporate abuses of minority shareholders unparalleled in the short history of modern Russian capitalism, setting…a benchmark for unacceptable behavior.”

And then, of course, there were predictions.  On Aug. 14, Sovetskaya Rossia published a letter signed by 43 prominent Russians public figures.  Titled “Stop the lethal reforms!” the letter called on President Putin and Russian security services to stop the “criminal reforms” conducted by “the amateurs [Alexei] Kudrin and [German] Gref ” (back in 2001, ministers of finance and economics and trade, respectively) who were supposedly leading the country to “the irreversible economic and social collapse.”  The inability to do so, warned the authors of the letter, carried the risk of Russia’s territorial disintegration.

To certain extent, such a grave forecast was rooted in a widespread belief that by 2001, Russia had exhausted all growth potential generated by the 1998 economic crisis and that the economy was entering a phase of “depressive stabilization.”  To many, a new economic crisis was “imminent” because of the “imminent” fall in oil prices: from $23 a barrel in 2001 to as low as $15 by 2006 (as predicted by Lehman Brothers).  This prediction didn’t hold true: the oil prices kept rising causing the unprecedented growth of the Russian economy in 1999-2008.

Talks of economic disasters inevitably transformed into predictions of political troubles.  Inostranetz, on Aug. 7, interpreted the election of the Communist candidate Gennady Khodyrev as a governor of Nizhny Novgorod as a sign of “at least a communist renaissance, if not a communist comeback.”  The publication went further arguing that “…the inevitable deterioration in the economic situation is also likely to contribute to strengthening the Communist Party.”  This prediction didn’t materialize: KPRF, the strongest Russian political party in 2001, has been steadily losing public support ever since.

On Aug. 1 and 9, Novaya Gazeta reported (referring to its “sources” in the Kremlin and the FSB) that President Putin was about to shake up his Cabinet and replace Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov with Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prusak.  Otherwise, according to the newspaper, Putin would be facing a “social upheaval.”  As the matter of fact, Kasyanov was dismissed only in February 2004, whereas Prusak held his governor position until 2007.

Then, Nezavisimaya Gazeta kicked it up a notch: apparently inspired by the 10^th anniversary of the 1991 putsch, the newspaper warned that as a result of infightings between Russian political elites, the country was up for a new coup d’état.  Moreover, then-Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov was identified as its possible leader.  Ivanov, however, chose a different career path and is currently serving as deputy prime minister in Putin’s Cabinet.

Although many media outlets supported the point of view that Putin would leave the Kremlin before the end of his first presidential term, it was the weekly Versia that volunteered to identify the name of the next President of Russia: Anatoly Chubais, then the chief of Russia’s United Energy Systems.  Versia argued that by August 2001, Chubais had accumulated enough of the administrative resource -- and legislative and media support – to successfully challenge Putin, who, according to the weekly, still had no “team of his own” (sounds familiar, does it not?).  To the weekly's credit, its editors didn’t assume that Chubais would wrest the presidential power from Putin’s hands in a coup d’état.  Instead, Chubais was supposed to win the 2004 presidential election.  Now, we know that while staying active in Russian politics, Chubais never attempted to seek presidency.

Prominent Russian political scientist Alexander Tsipko had better luck predicting Putin’s future.  Writing for the Jamestown Foundation, Tsipko forecast that Putin would remain president for the second term, after which he “will probably relinquish power in exactly the same was as Yeltsin did:” by appointing a “successor.”

Those whose predictions of Russia’s future were not as good as Tsipko’s must not despair.  Russia is often said to be a country with “unpredictable past.”  Predicting its future is even tougher.